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Airports are fast-growing dynamic infrastructure assets. For example, the Canadian airport 
industry is growing by 5% annually and generates about $8 billion yearly. Since the 9/11 
tragedy, airport security has been of paramount importance both in Canada and worldwide. 
Consequently, in 2002, in the wake of the attacks, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) put into force revised aviation security standards and recommended practices, and began 
a Universal Security Audit Program (USAP), in order to insure the worldwide safeguarding of 
civil aviation in general, and of airports in particular, against unlawful interference. To improve 
aviation security at both the national level and for individual airport, airport authorities in North 
America have initiated extensive programs to help quantify, detect, deter, and mitigate security 
risk. At the research level, a number of studies have examined scenarios involving threats to 
airports, the factors that contribute to airport vulnerability, and decision support systems for 
security management. However, more work is still required in the area of developing decision 
support tools that can assist airport officials in meeting the challenges associated with decision 
about upgrades; determining the status of their security systems and efficiently allocating 
financial resources to improve them to the level required. 
 
To help airport authorities make cost-effective decisions about airport security upgrades, this 
research has developed a risk-based optimization framework. The framework assists airport 
officials in quantitatively assessing the status of threats to their airports, the vulnerability to their 
security systems, and the consequences of security breaches. A key element of this framework is 
a new quantitative security metric ; the aim of which is to assist airport authorities self-assess the 
 iv
condition of their security systems, and to produce security risk indices that decision makers can 
use as prioritizing criteria and constraints when meeting decisions about security upgrades. 
These indices have been utilized to formulate an automated decision support system for 
upgrading security systems in airports.  
 
Because they represent one of the most important security systems in an airport, the research 
focuses on passenger and cabin baggage screening systems. Based on an analysis of the related 
threats, vulnerabilities and consequences throughout the flow of passengers, cabin baggage, and 
checked-in luggage, the proposed framework incorporates an optimization model for 
determining the most cost-effective countermeasures that can minimize security risks. For this 
purpose, the framework first calculates the level of possible improvement in security using a new 
risk metric. Among the important features of the framework is the fact that it allows airport 
officials to perform multiple “what-if” scenarios, to consider the limitations of security upgrade 
budgets, and to incorporate airport-specific requirements. Based on the received positive 
feedback from two actual airports, the framework can be extended to include other facets of 
security in airports, and to form a comprehensive asset management system for upgrading 
security at both single and multiple airports.  
 
From a broader perspective, this research contributes to the improvement of security in a major 
transportation sector that has an enormous impact on economic growth and on the welfare of 
regional, national and international societies. 
 v
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General 
As pivotal links in the mass transportation infrastructure, airports have a substantial impact on 
regional and national economies. In Canada, it is estimated that the airport industry generates 
about CAN$8 billion annually and provides about 150,000 jobs (Gooch, 2007). In the USA, it is 
estimated that airports produce US$380 billion annually and provide 5.2 million jobs (Airports 
Council International-North America [ACI-NA], 1999).  
 
Air transport is one of the busiest transportation modes, and it has experienced continuous and 
rapid growth over recent decades. Globally in 2006, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) reported that 2.1 billion passengers traveled though airports worldwide, 
and the international passenger traffic volumes rose 6.7% in 2006, while international domestic 
volumes rose 4.1%. Freight volumes also rose 3.0% and 5.4% for international and domestic 
cargo, respectively.  Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show passenger and freight growth trends (ICAO, 
2007).  
 
Figure  1.1: Passengers carried on Scheduled Air Services Worldwide, 1997-2006 (ICAO, 2007) 




Figure  1.2: Tones of Freight Carried Worldwide, 1997-2006 (ICAO, 2007) 
 
Similarly, the Airports Council International (ACI) predicted that “over the next 20 years, world 
passenger volumes will rise by 4.2 per cent annually…” and accordingly as illustrated in Figure 
 1.3, “Global passenger volumes will surpass the 5 billion mark by 2009 and reach 11 billion – or 
30 million passengers per day –by 2027.” (ACI, 2008) 
 
Figure  1.3: Global Passenger Traffic Forecast till 2027 (ACI, 2009) 
 
At national levels the trend will continue, in North America in forecasts for future, in the United 
States alone, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts that US airports will serve 
about 1.0 billion passengers annually by the year 2015 (Archibald, 2007). 
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While in Europe, in the UK for example, the Department for Transport (DfT) completed a 
comprehensive study, entitled “The Future of Air Transport,” which predicted that the demand 
on UK airports in 2030 will range from 400 to 600 million passengers per year, as illustrated in 
Figure  1.4 (DfT, 2003). 
 
 
Figure  1.4: Future Forecasts of UK Airports (DfT, 2003) 
 
 
Since the September 11 attacks, governments have spent billions of dollars to improve and 
maintain airport security systems. For example, in 2005, a total amount of $7.7 billion security 
initiative was declared by the Canadian government for security improvements. About $2 billion 
was allocated to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) to deal with security 
issues at Canadian airports (McLaughlin, 2005). Similarly, in the USA alone, between 2000 and 
2006, the federal government planned to fund US$60 billion in projects for airport development. 
A total of 15% of this amount was allocated for security projects at US airports (ACI-NA, 1999). 
The US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) also spent more than $5 billion over the 
same period to buy, maintain, and install explosives-detection systems (Darklord, 2008). In 
addition, The US Congress invested about $12 billion through the fiscal year of 2008 that was 
allocated through the Department of Homeland Security’s Grant Program (Dillon et al., 2009). 
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Following the substantial increase in security screener jobs, as depicted in Figure  1.5 (a, b), and 
the use of the new system, called Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System II (CAPPS 
II) in 2003 (Goo, 2003), the US Aviation Investment and Modernization Act of 2007 allocated 
US$1.5 billion to be spent over a three-year period in a newly established Aviation Security 
Capital Fund (Ash, 2007).  Likewise, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) 
spent about 2 billion dollars between 2001 and 2006 to enhance and develop security measures 
in the 89 publically accessed Canadian airports Figure  1.5 (b). The improvements included 
deploying 104 separate explosive-detection systems and hiring over 4000 screening officers for 
Canadian airports.  
 
                     
                    (a) Canada (CATSA, 2006)                     (b) United States (Goo, 2003) 
 
Figure  1.5: Security Measures after 9/11 
 
At the international level, the ICAO’s Ministerial Conference adopted a comprehensive strategic 
plan to maintain aviation security worldwide. Then in September 2002, Annex 17, a revised 
version entitled “The Aviation Security,” was published. The Annex 17 includes 74 security 
standards and recommended practices, which aim at standardizing and ensuring the preparedness 
of security systems at the national and airport levels (ICAO, 2002b).  
 More Security 
Airport security measures added since 
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Despite being one of the safest types of infrastructure, airports are extremely busy and 
considered to be among the most potentially vulnerable public assets; they are of paramount 
concern for governments around the world, especially after the events of September 11, 2001 
(9/11) (Dillon et al., 2009; Enoma & Allen, 2007). As the Security Industry Association 
reported, “By the year 2016, the airlines will need to double their existing fleet size. In order to 
manage this staggering growth, improved security measures must be planned for today” (SIA, 
2008). Thus, upgrading and enforcing security standards and procedures at airports have recently 
received enormous attention (Lippert and O'Connor, 2003), to ensure the preparedness and 
effectiveness of airport security systems (Francis et al., 2003).  
 
1.2 Research Motivation 
This research on upgrading security systems for airport networks has been motivated by the 
aspects explained in the following sections. 
1.2.1 The Challenge of Assessing Airport Security  
Prior to September 11th tragedy, aviation security did not rely on risk-based methodologies, and 
only introduced general measures to respond to airplane hijacking, bombing and accident events 
(Dillon et al., 2009 and Elias, 2008). Due to these events, governments worldwide and the 
aviation industry developed new security standards with more strict measures (Peterson et al., 
2007). Internationally, the ICAO mandated that governments should issue guidelines and 
National Aviation Security Program (NAVSECP), in order to satisfy ICAO’s Annex 17 security 
requirements. In the USA, The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed “a risk-
based methodology to complement the overarching National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP).” (Elias, 2008) One of the main objectives of the NIPP is “implementing a long-term risk 
management program.” Likewise, in Canada and the European Community, in 2002, a Strategic 
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Aviation Security Plan and common civil aviation security rules were issued to be implemented 
by airport authorities (GSP, 2002) and (EP, 2002).  
 
After the Sept. 11th attacks, the assessment of airport security risk assessment received growing 
interest to examine potential threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Although many airport 
authorities and researchers have initiated extensive programs and studies to help detect, deter, 
and mitigate airports’ security risks, many still hinder objective assessment of airports risks 
(Dillon et al., 2009). In particular, further research is required to provide quantitative assessment 
guidelines for security upgrades. 
 
1.2.2 Constraints on Security Funding 
Providing and maintaining the necessary financial resources for airport security upgrades have 
become a crucial problem. Choosing the types of security upgrades and the allocation of 
resources over a planning horizon are also key challenges for decision makers, who are 
constantly pressured by budget constraints. Minimizing the costs of these upgrades, and 
maximizing the return on investment are the key objectives that are difficult to attain. To do this, 
effective tools are required to support airport officials’ decisions. Other constraints include 
human factors, policies, technological developments, political considerations, and operational 
considerations (Antonni, 2002).  
1.2.3 The Need for an Efficient Decision Support System 
To help decision makers meet the requirements for security upgrades, within the budget limit and 
other operational constraints, a decision support framework is strongly needed to assist decision 
makers in various tasks, including: (1) conduct a comprehensive security risk assessment of 
potential threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, (2) examine the effectiveness of different 
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risk mitigation alternatives and their costs, and (3) optimally select the most cost-effective 
upgrade strategy. The risk-based optimization framework needs to employ a new quantitative 
metric within an optimization-based decision support system. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives and Scope 
The goal of this research is to provide decision makers in the aviation industry with a practical 
framework that helps optimize decisions about security upgrades for airport terminals. The focus 
of the research is on the Passenger and Cabin Baggage Screening System. The detailed research 
objectives are as follows: 
1. Investigate the various airport security systems and related national and international 
security regulations.  
2. Investigate various security upgrade options for passengers, cabin baggage, and checked-
in luggage along with their costs and effectiveness to detect threats. 
3. Develop a new quantitative metric to assess the security risks of various systems through 
a detailed assessment process of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. 
4. Develop a decision support system for airport security upgrades that utilizes cost-
effective countermeasures to minimize security risks. 
5. Experiment with optimization techniques to determine the optimum security upgrade 
decisions.  
6. Develop a computerized prototype and validate the system performance and usefulness to 
airport officials.  
 
The proposed framework is applicable to the airport terminal Passenger and Cabin Baggage 
Screening System (PCBSS), with special focus on PCBSS physical measures that mitigate 
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security risks. It is assumed that the non-physical measures, such as policy issues and human and 
training related factors, equipment maintainability, etc, are applied satisfactorily. Integrating 
these factors will be a future challenge, and some initial suggestion for how to approach this 
within the framework proposed here are made in the final chapter of the thesis. The proposed 
methodology is applicable to all airport security systems within the PCBSS. It is noted that the 
research focuses on passenger terminals in international airports, which require more 
comprehensive security systems than domestic airports. The developed framework provides 
airport security officials with a practical tool for maximizing the security investment return, 
minimizing security risk, documenting their decision process, and meeting their specific 
constraints and security standards at the subsystem, system, airport and multi-airport levels.  
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The research methodology that was employed to achieve the above mentioned objectives is 
illustrated in Figure  1.6. The methodology tasks are as follows: 
1. Airport Security Systems Review: Conduct a comprehensive survey to investigate up-
to-date security systems requirements and related risk assessments. Through this survey:  
a- Security systems (modules) and their important in-depth security aspects at 
international airports were investigated. 
b- Risk-based assessment methodologies and the rationale of quantitative risk analysis in 
terms of threats, vulnerability, and consequence were reviewed.  
c- Options for upgrading decisions were evaluated and quantified so that an upgrading 









2. Development of a Security Risk-Based Quantitative Metric: A new quantitative 
security risk metric is developed. The proposed development involves a quantitative 
metric to assess the effectiveness of airport security systems. The process for developing 
the proposed metric includes: 
a- Review ICAO’s seven security systems (standards and measures), an international 
airport security program, and the current in place mitigation measures, if any, in order 
to create a list of security measures and their possible assessment schemes. 
Develop A Decision Support System for  
Airport Security Upgrades 
 
 
Develop and Validate Prototype  
Experiment with different Optimization Techniques 
(Traditional & Non-Traditional) 
Review ICAO Seven  
Security Systems 
Develop a Risk-Based Security Assessment  
Quantitative Metric 
Review Security  
And Mitigation 
Measures





Test Different Objective Function Formulations  






b- Investigate potential security risks dimensions in terms of airports’ threats that the 
airport is subject to, existing vulnerabilities that could be exploited, and possible 
consequences that would result if an attack was a success.  
c- Develop a security risk-based quantitative metric that incorporates the important 
security dimensions.  The metric provides a hierarchal score as a Security Risk Index 
(SRI) at each security system components, system, and the overall airport levels. The 
SRI is used for building a decision support system for airport security upgrades. 
 
3. Development of a Decision Support System for Airport Security Upgrades: The 
quantitative metric indices, upgrade decision options, and influencing constraints are 
incorporated to develop an optimization-based model. The developed model is tested for 
the Passenger and Cabin Baggage Screening System. Techniques such as, a simple 
ranking method, a mathematical optimization, and a non-traditional optimization 
technique are used to solve the optimization problem. Further enhancement involves 
testing different forms of objective functions. A computerized prototype has been built 
and tested to validate the potential functionality and practicality of the system. 
 
4. Prototype Development and Validation: The developed framework has been validated 
through the following approaches: 
a- Expert opinion: The developed framework was presented during research meetings 
and interviews that were held with involved stakeholders, such as airport security 
officials, representatives of government security agencies, and airport authorities. The 
purpose of these meetings was to collect their professional feedback regarding 
application and operation efficiencies. 
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b- Case Study: A real-world case study at an international airport was conducted. The 
goal was to test the output of the developed system with respect to actual upgrading 
decisions and achieved security levels, and then to compare these results with the 
airport’s accomplishments.  
 
1.5 Summary 
Airports are one class of a nation’s vital transportation infrastructure and are key assets to a 
dynamic business environment. After the events of September 11th, security assessment research 
has focused on risk-based approaches. To help airport authorities with cost-effective decisions on 
airport security upgrades, this research proposes a risk-based optimization framework that 
focuses on the Passenger and Cabin Baggage Screening System, and proposes a risk-based 
optimization framework for airport security upgrades. The framework includes a quantitative 
security risk metric to assess the airports’ threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences expressed in 
terms of Security Risk Indexes (SRIs). Based on those SRIs, the framework incorporates an 
optimization model to determine the cost-effective countermeasures that minimize security risks. 
Among the important features of the framework is that it calculates the level of security 
improvement using the new risk metric, allows airport officials to perform multiple “what if” 
scenarios, and considers security-upgrade budget limits and airport-specific requirements. Once 
the passenger and baggage screening system is tested, based on feedback from actual airports, it 
can be extended to include the other facets of security in airports, to form a comprehensive asset 
management system for airport-security upgrades. For both single- and multiple-level airports, 
the optimization model will have the potential to optimize and prioritize decisions about airport 
security upgrading projects so that they are both efficient and effective for the planning horizon.
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As a fundamental component of society’s transportation infrastructure, airports are classified as 
one of the nation’s vital transportation assets. Their importance arises from their role in rapidly 
transporting passengers, goods, and freight, and in providing services. This role universally 
facilitates trade and industrial international relations. Because they are dynamic business 
environments, they also affect local, national, and international development economic and 
influence global markets. 
This chapter presents a detailed overview of civil infrastructure assets and their related 
management systems, along with examples of their advances, frameworks, tools, and techniques.  
Airport Performance Indicators were also addressed as a means to evaluate the level of service in 
airports. In addition this chapter documents an intensive review of development in aviation 
security, methodologies, simulation studies, and risk-based research on airport security and its 
management systems.  
 
2.2 Civil Infrastructure Assets 
Civil infrastructure assets are recognized as a key “fundamental foundation of societal and 
economic functions.” (Mishalani and McCord, 2006) Generally, they can be grouped into seven 
function-related categories, as shown Figure  2.1: Recreational Facilities, Communication, 
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Buildings, Transportation, Waste Management, Water and Waste Water, and Energy Production 
and Distribution (Hudson et al., 1997).  Each of these categories is divided into sub-categories. 
For example, the Transportation category includes Mass Transit, Intermodal Facilities, Air 
Transportation, Ground Transportation, and Waterways and Ports. Similarly, under each of these 
sub-categories there are a number of assets. Airports, which are the focus of this research, are 
one of the pivotal assets in air transportation infrastructure systems (Hudson et al., 1997). 
 
Figure  2.1: Civil Infrastructure Catégories (Based on Hudson et al., 1997) 
 
All infrastructure assets in North America, and worldwide as well, are experiencing huge levels 
of deterioration, as shown in the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) report cards of 
2003, 2005 and 2009 (Figure 2.2). The 2003 report card shows a comparison with 2001. In 2005, 
aviation infrastructure was graded at a discouraging D+, as shown in Figure 2.2b. The ASCE 
report estimated total investment needs of $1.6 trillion to bring America’s infrastructure to 
acceptable levels (ASCE, 2005).  The discouraging continued to falls to D as shown in Figure 
 2.2c, as a result, the needed investments increased to $2.2 trillion (ASCE, 2009). Therefore, the 
condition of aviation infrastructure is not improving as a comparison of 2009, 2005 ASCE report 
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card with the 2003 demonstrates (Figure  2.2a) (ASCE, 2009). In 2005, ASCE graded the security 
of America's critical infrastructure at grade I and reported that “The information needed to 
accurately assess its status is not readily available to engineering professionals. This information 
is needed to better design, build and operate the nation's critical infrastructure in more secure 
ways. Security performance standards, measures and indices need to be developed and funding 
must be focused on all critical infrastructure sectors, beyond aviation” (ASCE, 2007). 
 
         
     (a) America’s Infrastructure 2003       (b) ASCE Report Card on the America’s  (c) America’s Infrastructure 2009                       
         Progress Report (ASCE, 2003)                Infrastructure (ASCE, 2005)               Progress Report (ASCE, 2009) 
                             
 
Figure  2.2: ASCE Report Cards for Infrastructure 
 
 
Airports are becoming even more demanding transportation infrastructure assets.  The last three 
decades have witnessed very rapid growth and increased use of technological innovations. On 
the international level, the ICAO annual report of 2006 showed continued growth in air traffic of 
4.1% worldwide (ICAO, 2007).  At the national level, according to Transport Canada (TC, 
2006), air traffic through Canadian airports continued to increase and hit a more than 5% growth 
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the UK, the passenger traffic growth through UK airports is forecasted to reach 400 to 600 
million by 2030, compared to 200 million in 2003 (DfT, 2003). It is obvious that the rapid 
increase in air transport demands will be a demonstrating trend in the aviation industry and will 
place high stress on the security systems at airports and their associated technologies.  
 
The increase in air transportation demand will be accompanied by a rising number of regional 
and super-jumbo jets. These jets have to be accommodated with compatible infrastructure and 
security provisions (ASCE, 2005). In parallel with the expected expansion at airports, projected 
air traffic growth, and increased funding requirements, the security systems in airports must also 
increase. To meet these challenges, funding by national governments is critical. In the USA, for 
example, ASCE recommended that the “US Congress must reauthorize funding for the Airport 
and Airway Trust Fund and enact an increase in user fees as necessary for continued funding of 
the Airport Improvement Program.” Consequently, the US Federal Government allocated $5 
billion in 2006 for the Transportation Security Administration to spend on improving and 
upgrading security systems at the 450 commercial airports across the USA. On the other hand, 
ASCE, in its 2005 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, stated that “The National Plan of 
Integrated Airport Systems estimates that over the next five years (2005-2009) $39.5 billion will 
be needed to meet the infrastructure demands of all segments of civil aviation” (ASCE, 2005). 
 
 
2.3 Infrastructure Management Systems 
Decision makers need to keep infrastructure at an acceptable service level, consider their limited 
funds, prioritize their decisions, and satisfy planning time frames and other practical constraints 
at both single and multiple levels.  In response to this need to consider all the multiple, complex 
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factors involved in decisions, infrastructure management systems have emerged (Flintsch and 
Chen, 2004).   
2.3.1 Advances in Infrastructure Management Systems 
Since the mid 1960’s, significant research has been undertaken by industry and academic 
scholars with the goal of developing systems to evaluate, manage, and upgrade infrastructure 
assets. As stated in the 2000 report of the US General Accounting Office, well-managed 
infrastructure systems will positively increase the productivity and competence of economies at 
the national level (GAO, 2000). Managing these assets requires the integration of engineering 
principles with sound business applications and thorough economic knowledge.  “A management 
system has been proposed as a solution for balancing growing demands, aging infrastructure, and 
constrained resources in the transportation sector.” (Federal Highway Association [FHWA], 
1999) An asset management process involves the use of planning and programming schemes as 
well as management systems. A generic asset management framework that was introduced and 












Figure  2.3: Generic Asset Management Framework (FHWA, 1999) 
Performance Monitoring (Feedback) 
Program Implementation 
Short and Long-Term Plans (Project Selection) 
Alternative Evaluation/Program Optimization 
Condition Assessment/Performance Prediction 
Asset Inventory 




The system incorporates a broad database of asset inventory, condition   assessment performance   
prediction   modules, and   rehabilitation possibilities. Several modules and decision support 
tools are integrated in order to analyze, compare, and select the most cost-effective solution. This 
framework, and many similar ones proposed in the literature, assures that these solutions will 
meet overall goals, efficient performance levels, and user expectations (Flintsch and Chen, 
2004). In general, asset management systems can support decisions not only at the individual 
asset level (e.g., an airport) but also at the network, or multiple assets, level (e.g., a network of 
airports). These two levels of management are strongly merged and are influenced by external 
decision-making factors, constraints, and a shared data-base, as shown in Figure  2.4 (Hudson et 








Figure  2.4: Infrastructure management framework in principle (Hudson et al., 1997) 
 
Since airports are critical infrastructure assets, they will require expansions in facilities, services, 
and funding. These expansions will make it harder to maintain the security of the diverse 
components of airports: passenger terminals, cargo terminals, catering, aircraft maintenance, air 
traffic control and navigation aids, runways and taxiways, aprons, buildings, hotels, commercial 
and industrial concessions, etc. As a result, an overall framework for airport infrastructure 




wide Level Project/selection Level 
Data Base
 18
Figure  2.5 illustrates applied tools and techniques that infrastructure decision support systems 
most often employ (Flintsch and Chen, 2004). As Figure  2.5 shows, management systems can be 
divided into two main branches. The first includes recent techniques to support decision systems, 
and the second includes applied decision support techniques. Each of these branches is further 
divided into main divisions. These divisions can again be subdivided into detailed levels. For 
example, decision support techniques include performance assessment, needs analysis, and 
tradeoff analysis, while tools and techniques include traditional approaches and soft computing 
techniques.  
 
Figure  2.5: Infrastructure-related tools and techniques 
 
 
Mishalani and McCord (2006) reported that much advancement has been carried out in 
“infrastructure condition assessment; deterioration modeling; and optimal maintenance, repair, 
and reconstruction.” Recently, sophisticated tools such as soft computing have been introduced. 
Soft computing techniques are among the most promising tools because they have extremely 
promising capabilities of enhancing the current processes, procedures, and techniques of 
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infrastructure management (Mishalani and McCord, 2006).  Flintsch and Chen (2004) 
summarized in a comprehensive review various soft computing techniques, their applications, 
and a listing of the scholars who utilized them in different types of infrastructure (Table  2.1). In 
this table, it is clear that a significant number of scholars have utilized these evolutionary 
techniques in main areas of application, such as asset performance, needs analysis prioritization 
schemes, and optimization techniques. It is also obvious from the table that Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANN), Fuzzy Logic Systems, and other Hybrid Systems were widely used in 
condition assessment tasks, whereas genetic algorithms (GAs) are reported as the most employed 
optimization technique.  
Table  2.1: Summary of Soft Computing Applications in Infrastructure Management 
 (Based on Flintsch and Chen, 2003) 
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Pant et al. (1993), Kaseko and Ritchie (1993), Hajek and Hurdal 
(1993), Fwa and Chan (1993), Eldin and Senouci (1995), Flintsch et 
al. (1996), Razaqpur et al. (1996), Cattan and Mohammadi (1997), 
Huang and Moore (1997),  Alsugair and Al-Qudrah (1998), La Torre 
et al. (1998), Owusu-Ababia (1998), Shekharan (1998), Wang et al. 
(1998), Van der Gryp et al. (1998), Martinelli and Shoukry (2000), 
Lou et al. (2001), Farias et al. (2003), Felker et al. (2003), Fontul et al. 
(2003), Lee and Lee (2004), Lin et al. (2003), Sadek et al. (2003), 
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Elton and Juang (1988), Zhang et al. (1993), Grivas and Shen (1995), 
Prechaverakul and Hadipriono (1995), Shoukry et al. (1997), Wang 
and Liu (1997), Fwa and Shanmugam (1998), Cheng et al. (1999), 












 2   1 6 
Fwa et al. (1996), Liu et al. (1997), Pilson et al. (1999), Shekharan 
(2000), Miyamoto et al. (2000), Chan et al. (2001), Hedfi and 













6 1  2   
Ritchie et al. (1991), Chou et al. (1995), Taha and Hanna (1995), 
Martinelli et al. (1995), Abdelrahim and George (2000), Chiang et al. 
(2000), Chae and Abraham (2001), Liang et al. (2001), Flintsch 
(2002) 
 20
2.3.2 Examples of infrastructure management systems 
Pavement management systems (PMS) and bridge management systems (BMS) were among the 
earliest developed infrastructure management systems. They have emerged as a result of the 
infrastructure agencies’ focus on finding a balanced approach to infrastructure management 
(Flintsch and Chen, 2004).  Other infrastructure management systems have been developed to 
suit the needs, criticality, function, and nature of other asset systems. Some of the applied 
infrastructure management systems are highlighted in the following sections.  
 
MicroPAVER Pavement Management System: MicroPAVER is a state-of-art technology for 
pavement management that was initially developed in the late 1970s for the management, 
maintenance, and rehabilitation (M&R) of the enormous pavement inventory of the US 
Department of Defense (DOD) (MicroPaver, 2007). As described by the US Army Corp of 
Engineers, “MicroPAVER uses inspection data and a pavement condition index (PCI™) rating 
from zero (failed) to 100 (excellent) for consistently describing a pavement's condition and for 
predicting its M&R needs many years into the future.” In general, in addition to the calculation 
of a pavement condition index, a Pavement Management System (PMS) includes a rehabilitation 
analysis that helps optimize budget-constrained decisions for the rehabilitation program, and 
predicts the effect on the condition of the network. Decision makers can use any PMS to 
optimally allocate their funds, in order to achieve the objectives of their M&R programs 
(Corazzola and Poli, 2003). In 1993, the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) 
adopted the PCI™ for airports as an ASTM standard (MicroPaver, 2007).  
 
MicroBUILDER: MicroBUILDER is known as an engineered management system (EMS) for 
buildings. It was developed by the US Army Corp of Engineers as multitalented software for 
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optimally managing M&R plans and their building projects at different facilities. The software 
merges benefits of the engineering technologies, asset management systems, condition 
assessment and modeling techniques, and analysis methodologies (Karim, 2003). The main 
feature of MicroBUILDER is that it uses a subcomponent condition index (CI), which is a 
numerical index between 0 (failed) and 100 (excellent). The Construction Engineering Research 
Laboratory (CERL) indicates that the CI has been incorporated into inspection procedures and 
data base analyses supporting M&R planning for civil works facilities. An advantage of CI is 
that it can be used in conjunction with cost curves to determine condition deterioration curves, 
which will then predict cost-effective multiyear repair budgets at various CI scores over the 
M&R planning horizon in accordance with each facility’s circumstances. The MicroBUILDER 
has the potential to be integrated with other seismic risk assessment systems, engineered 
management systems, GIS, etc. (CERL, 2007). 
 
MircoROOFER: This software is similar in function and features to MicroPAVER and 
MicroBUILDER. It was developed to help building engineers assess the condition of built-up or 
single-ply roofing systems for the purposes of minimizing expenditures on M&R work orders for 
roofs based on condition index (CI) procedures for assessing the overall roof CI, while 
increasing the level of roof stock safety and serviceability (Morcous and Rivard, 2003). The 
MicroROOFER program use a process compiled from three components: the establishment of a 
network inventory database, condition inspection using an objective and repeatable rating 
system, and network-level and project-level management to select the optimum M&R strategy 
(Karim, 2003). 
 
Other Management Systems: CarteGraph Systems Inc., a software developer for management 
systems, offers a number of asset management packages, including BRIDGEview, SIGNview, 
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SIGNALview, and PAVERMTview. The main purpose of all these packages is to help the 
managers of facilities efficiently and cost-effectively manage, maintain, and repair their assets. 
 
2.3.3 Airport Management Systems  
A number of management systems have been developed for airports, and computer-based 
versions are enormously in use, especially in Canadian, US, and Caribbean airports. For 
example, among infrastructure management systems that Lester B. Pearson International Airport 
uses are Airport Maintenance Management System (AMMS), Restoration Program, and Greater 
Toronto Airport Authority (GTAA) High Performance Building Policy (Karim, 2003). The 
features and capabilities of these systems are explained in following sections. 
 
Airport Maintenance Management System (AMMS): The purpose of AMMS, as with other 
infrastructure management systems, is to plan, organize, direct, and control maintenance 
projects, allocate funds, and optimize maintenance strategies. Among the main capabilities of 
this system are maintenance task life-cycle analysis; workload and resources balancing and 
budget development during the planning period for current and upcoming fiscal years; and 
resource and cost tracking for active work orders by the month, quarter, etc.  The system can 
operate in automated mode, or users with different access level can provide a Master Work Order 
with related health and safety checklists (Karim, 2003). 
 
Restoration Program: Restoration is a management program that enables decision makers to 
sustain targeted levels of service for their facilities through the program’s ability to 
systematically manage predefined replacement activities (LBPIA, 1985). Based on the facility’s 
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funding rate, the program can predict the most appropriate replacement timing and associated 
funds. The program is designed to help officials make decisions at the macro level, such as long-
term planning for 10-20 years, or at the micro level, such as short-term planning for 1-4 years 
(Karim, 2003).  
 
GTAA High Performance Building Policy: This policy deals with the capital and operational 
costs encountered over a facility’s physical and fiscal lifecycles and with the related benefits of 
high-performance buildings. Based on the four levels of performance as determined by 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), which is a Green Building Rating 
System developed by the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) in 1994, GTAA was advised to 
adopt the silver level, which allows optimum returns with respect to tradeoffs of the funds 
employed. LEED certification is issued based on a set of required "Prerequisites" and a variety of 
"Credits," which will determine the level at which the candidate building is qualified. The four 
levels of certification are listed in Table  2.2 (USGBC, 2007; Karim, 2003). 
Table  2.2: LEED Levels of Performance (LEED) 
Level Premium Percentage Non-Innovation Points 
Certified $0 %, no premium 40-50% 
Silver $0-4% capital cost premium 50-60% 
Gold 5%-15% capital cost premium 60-80% 
Platinum 15%-25% capital cost premium over 80% 
 
Based on the Hudson et al. (1997) definition of unitized facilities, an airport is a good example of 
such facilities, making use of the following infrastructure management systems: MicroPAVER 
MicroBUILDER, Airport Maintenance Management System (AMMS), Restoration Program, 
GTAA High Performance Building Policy, and other systems. These systems are used by some 
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airport authorities either separately or integrated to some extent within the airport’s environment. 
Managing different airport facilities and utilizing these systems effectively and efficiently are the 
core challenges that face airport authorities around the world. One of the critical systems that 
airport authorities must make every effort to manage well is security because security measures 
in each facility must be sufficient to protect the aviation industry in general, and airports 
specifically, from actions of unlawful interference, and to mitigate threat levels in order to realize 
reliable aviation security and a safe industry environment at the international and national levels 
(ICAO, 2002b). 
 
2.4 Airport Performance Indicators  
Another research direction with respect to airport security is to develop indicators and indexes to 
evaluate and measure performance.  Through interviews and research workshops and from other 
sources such as the internet and the media, Enoma and Allen (2007) investigated performance 
measures for UK airports safety and security issues and developed a list of five potential key 
performance indicators: breach of security, evacuation in the case of emergency (fire, bomb 
threat, and acts of terrorism), hysteria control, attack on airport facilities or installations, and 
destructive or criminal behavior by a passenger on board an aircraft. 
 
Developing performance indicators has been a major topic in different areas. Tangen (2003) 
presented a review of the currently used performance measures in the manufacturing sector, and 
discussed the five common types of performance objectives: cost, flexibility, speed, 
dependability, and quality. These objectives were proposed by Slack et al. (2001) as important 
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indicators to consider in performance evaluation. Examples of financial and non-financial 
indicators are listed in Table  2.3. 
 




Measure Form Drawbacks Reference 
Financial 
measures 
- Profit margins 
- Return on assets 
- Return on equity 
- Lack of relevance to the control of   
  production. 
- Pressure to maximize short-term result. 
- Quantify performance in financial terms. 
- Weak in reflecting department’s unique 
characteristics and priorities. 
- Not applicable to the new management  
  techniques.  
- Don not penalize overproduction and do 
not adequately identify the cost of quality. 
Ross et al., 1993; 
Zairi, 1994 ; Maskell, 
1991 ; Crawford and 
Cox, 1990; Ghalayini 
et al.,1997; Maskell, 
1991; Ghalayini et al., 




- Cost-drivers - Not proven to provide accurate product  
  costs. 
- Can not gauge adequately manufacturing 
performance relative to a competitive 
strategy. 
Kaplan and Cooper, 
1998; Hill, 1995; 
Neely et al., 1997; 
White, 1996; Maskell, 
1991 
- Partial productivity measures  
 
- Can be useful if the workforce is a 
dominating production factor. 




- Total productivity measures - Difficult to understand and to measure. 
- Not always accurate because of difficulties 
in calculating such measures in practice,. 
Sumanth, 1994; Suh, 






- Ratio between value-adding time and  
  total time 
- Can not be classified as a real productivity 
measure, since total time does not provide 
information about the consumed resources 
in the production process. 
Arnold, 1991; Jackson 
and Petersson, 1999; 




- Source of data ± internal or external 
- Type of data ± subjective or objective 
- Reference ± benchmark or self- 
  referenced 
- Orientation to process ± input to  
  some process or outcome of some  
  process 
- Most do not offer much help in developing   
  insight into the relationships between    
  performance objectives. 
 
White, 1996  
Intrinsic 
dimensions 
- Decision type ± strategic/tactical/ operational 
- Aggregation level ± overall/partial 
- Measurement unit ±  monetary/physical/  
  dimensionless 
 Flapper et al., 1996 
 
In describing the current situation of airport performance research, Benoit (2006) states that 
“performance measurement in air transport security is hampered by the fact that comparative and 
empirical data on specific performance measures, benchmarks and targets being used in other 
jurisdictions is largely unpublicized and unavailable.” In addition, “few formal industry 
standards [have] yet [been] developed against which nations can gauge their proficiency in areas 
such as screener attrition, infiltration testing and training levels.”  
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Pitt et al. (2002) claimed that operational efficiency of any facility is highly weakened by 
incompatible selected type technology. As the contemporary generations of airport and aviation 
industries are relying primarily on the new emerging technologies to operate efficiently and 
manage their infrastructure assets and facilities effectively, the task becomes more challenging to 
achieve prescribed objectives in terms of performance, quality, and security as illustrated in 
Figure  2.6. As a result, the facility design and configuration are the key factor achieving these 
objectives. For example, poor design and inadequate configuration with respect to deploying 
baggage screening machines and passenger conveying system to enhance security measures will 
produce long waiting queues, and consequently will result in delays and low performance rates 
(Pitt et al., 2002). Accordingly, the continuous delays will generate crowds and possible violent 
passenger activities and may lead to more security breaches. Table  2.4 summarizes more 
examples on aviation and airport performance indicators. 
 
 
Figure  2.6: Desirable Performance Objectives (Pitt et al., 2002)
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Table  2.4: Examples of Airport Performance Indicators Research 
 Title Author Type Objective 
Methodology / 
Work Program 















Develops and tests a set 
of key performance 
indicators for airport 
facility management, 
with particular focus on 
safety and security. 
Literature review; 
interviews of key airport 
personnel; workshops and 
observations; 
questionnaires; internet; 
and other media. 
A potential list of key 
performance indicators 
for airport safety and 
security. 
The paper addresses a good 
approach for measuring 
relative performance of 
airport safety and security 
and the role of facility 
management in achieving 
that level of performance. 













and analyzes the 
existing performance 
measurement criteria 
currently in use by the 
Canadian Air Transport 
Security Authority. 
Interviews and telephone 
conversations with persons 
responsible for various 
aspects of performance 
measurement within both 
CATSA and TC.  
A findings report that 
suggested analysis of the 
issue of performance 
measures and the 
identification of gaps 
and/ or recommendations. 
Much of the critical 
information with regard to 
key performance targets, the 
frequency of evaluation, and 
the qualitative target levels, 


















modeling of safety 
performance evaluation. 
Review and synthesis of 
literature. 
Ten major safety 
performance evaluation 
approaches are identified; 
based on the approaches, 
quantitative and 
qualitative models have 
been proposed. 
Several research questions 
remain to be answered 
related to the impact of 
these provisional safety 
performance measures. 
Frequency co-efficient, 
severity co-efficient, and 
safety program performance 
models have potential 






























Describes the TSA’s 
efforts to measure the 
effectiveness of its 
aviation security 
initiatives and addresses 
key challenges to 
further enhance US 
aviation security. 
Empirical investigations. A list of opportunities to 
help ensure useful annual 
plans and applied 
practices for the 
effectiveness of the 
aviation security system. 
Encouraging efforts to 
develop the information and 
tools needed to measure the 
effectiveness of aviation 




2.5 Development of Aviation Security 
Since the 1960s, aviation safety and security have developed rapidly (TRB, 2007) and have 
caught the attention of governments around the world (Enoma and Allen, 2007). Hijackings of 
airplanes and bomb threats caused major distress for airport authorities in the 1970s and 1980s 
(SIA, 2008; NAS, 1996). On December 21, 1988, a famous incident shook the aviation industry. 
Pan American’s airplane was blown up over the town of Lockerbie in Scotland. Such incidents 
motivated the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to play a significant role in 
promoting and implementing new security standards and recommended practices. These 
standards are vital because airport authorities continually confront very demanding, active 
changing industry and market circumstances (Fry et al., 2005). Lately, the events of 9/11 put 
airport security systems, standards, and current procedures at the center of attention 
(Frederickson and LaPorte, 2002) Vulnerability of airports was emphasized further following the 
July 7, 2005, London bomb attacks (Enoma and Allen, 2007). 
 
ICAO is one of the United Nations’ specialized agencies. ICAO’s main mission is to support and 
encourage cooperation between its 190 member states. According to the 1944 Chicago 
convention that created the ICAO, ICAO is “responsible for establishing international standards 
and recommended practices and procedures, covering the technical, economic and legal fields of 
international civil aviation operations, and is ultimately responsible for promoting the safety, 
regularity and efficiency of international civil aviation” (ICAO, 1944). Over the years, the 
Chicago convention has been enhanced by the appending of 18 different Annexes that govern 
civil aviation activities, technical requirements and regulations, standards, and recommended 
practices for achieving the safety and security of global civil aviation. Following repeated 
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incidents of high-jacking and the blowing up of airplanes, the ICAO in collaboration with its 
member states introduced the following international conventions: 
1. Convention on “Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,” 
Tokyo, September 14, 1963 
2. Convention on “The Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,” The Hague, 
Netherlands, December 16, 1970 
3. Convention on “The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation,” Montréal, September 23, 1971 
4. “Montréal Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation,” Montréal, February 24, 1971 
5. Convention on “Detection of Plastic Explosives,” Montréal, March 1, 1991 
 
To put these conventions into force, the ICAO published Annex 17; entitled “Aviation Security,” 
in order to standardize aviation security measures, procedures, and practices worldwide. The first 
version of Annex 17 was issued in 1974 (Drury, 1998). To date, eleven amendments have been 
added to Annex 17. It defines civil aviation security as “a combination of measures and human 
and material resources intended to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.” 
Currently, Annex 17 contains 74 individual standards that state minimum mandatory security 
requirements and 19 recommended practices to help achieve that goal (ICAO, 2002d).  
 
2.5.1 Universal Security Audit Program (USAP) 
In the aftermath of the tragic attacks on September 11, 2001, the ICAO general assembly 
adopted resolution A33-1 that calls for the establishment of a universal program to audit aviation 
security arrangements and practices in all international airports worldwide. The resolution 
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recommended the ICAO Secretary General reviews and consults the audit program that was 
being used by the European Civil Aviation Committee. As a result, to help implement the new 
security standards, the Universal Security Audit Program (USAP) emerged as a comprehensive 
process for auditing aviation security. USAP was approved by ICAO’s Council in June 2002. In 
November 2002, mandatory security audits were launched. The program helps enhance security 
by identifying deficiencies in member states’ security systems, at national and airport levels 
(Table  2.5), by urging action for resolving any such deficiencies. The program is also intended to 
promote greater understanding of systemic security issues and build confidence in aviation 
security around the world (ICAO, 2002d). 
 
Table  2.5: USAP’s Security System Categories at the Airport Level (ICAO, 2002a) 
 
 
The tragic events of 9/11 resulted in the expedition of the adoption of USAP as a way to promote 
global aviation security through periodic auditing of the airports of the member states in order to 
determine their status with respect to implementing ICAO’s Annex 17 Standards (Zuzak, 2003). 
USAP’s audits are conducted at both the national and airport levels in order to evaluate both a 
state’s aviation security capabilities and the actual security measures in place (ICAO, 2002d). 
Since its launch in June 2002, USAP has proven to be the basis of a strengthening of civil 
aviation security systems at the global, national, and airport levels (Zuzak, 2003). Therefore, for 
Level Module Security System Category 
I Organization and Administration National 
Level II Co-operations with other States 
III Organization and Administration 
IV Access Control 
V Passenger and Baggage Screening 
VI Hold Baggage Security 
VII In-Flight Security 





IX Responses to Unlawful Interference and Contingency Arrangements 
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the purpose of developing the proposed research framework, USAP’s seven security modules at 
the airport level (Table  2.5) are adopted as the main components of the proposed framework for 
analysis and development. 
 
2.5.2 Security Systems in Airports 
The security devices in an airport are deployed in various configurations based on the security 
dimensions; the requirements of stakeholders; and other factors, such as operation and 
maintenance costs, passenger flow, operational space, and other architectural requirements. For 
example, Rao and Keith (1999) stated that advanced technology explosive-detection systems 
(ATs) can be set up in different patterns in passenger terminals, such as the lobby, the 
lobby/curbside area, and the bag room. Recently, ICAO recommended that each member state 
establish a national-level government agency to enforce Annex 17 standards (Zuzak, 2004). 
According to Annex 17, USAP classifies the airport security systems into nine categories. The 
first two relate to “National Level” security arrangements, while the remaining seven deal with 
security concerns at the “Airport Level” (Table  2.5) (ICAO, 2002a). Each category includes a 
number of modules, which should be audited and evaluated by the USAP audit team according to 
the status and complexity of each airport. For the purposes of this research, the focus is the seven 
systems at the airport level along with their subsystems.  
 
For each of the seven security systems (modules), USAP identifies a number of ICAO standards 
to be audited. Figure  2.7 is an illustration of a typical audit cycle, which takes about nine months. 
The audit process challenges airport authorities to align their processes to be compatible with 
ICAO standards. As shown in Figure  2.7, audit visit takes about 16 days, with the final audit 
report sent two months later. The audit report is a detailed text-based document that contains the 
 32













Figure  2.7: Typical ICAO Audit Cycle (based on ICAO, 2002d) 
 
After the site visit, the ICAO’s audit team analyzes and assesses the airport’s current condition 
against the Annex 17 standards. The USAP report summarizes all defects and qualitatively 
evaluates the components of an airport’s security system by assigning them to one of the 
categories shown in Table  2.6. 
Table  2.6: USAP’s Report Evaluation Sets (ICAO, 2002d) 
 
Metric Explanation 
Set1 Meets the Annex 17 standard. Recommendations may be made to further enhance 
measures or to address any problems linked to the quality of implementation. 
Set2 Does not meet the Annex 17 standard. A category 2 item represents a minor need for 
improvement for compliance to be achieved. In this case, improvement is necessary to 
ensure proper implementation of this Annex 17 standard and action should be taken by 
the contracting state. 
Set3 Does not meet the Annex 17 standard. A category 3 item represents a serious need for 
improvement for compliance to be achieved. In this case, improvement is essential to 
correct the deficiencies and to comply with Annex 17. The Contracting State should 
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2.5.3 Security measures at airports 
Airports have been targeted by terrorists worldwide during the last four decades (Zuzak, 1990), 
and similarly, the aviation industry as a whole has become a fertile environment for different 
types and levels of threats (Lazarick, 2001). To mitigate the security risk at airports, a number of 
security measures have been developed and implemented both nationally and internationally, for 
example, airports in the United Kingdom were the first authorities to implement strengthened 
security measures in the early 1990s (Drury, 1998). After the bomb threat in July 2006, in which 
an apparent plot to detonate bombs onboard aircraft at Heathrow Airport in London was 
discovered, security measures were heightened in UK airports. The new measures are graphically 
represented in Figure  2.8 (BBC, 2006). 
 
1. Road access to airports is restricted. No parking zones outside airport terminals, traffic monitored by CCTV and police. 
2. Armed police and CCTV monitor terminal building. 
3. All passengers asked about contents of bags and whether they packed them personally. All sharp objects must be placed into 
checked-in baggage.  
4. Passports required for most check-ins, passengers' passports inspected. Names of all passengers flying to the US must be 
submitted to US officials for cross-referencing against a database of "high-risk" terror suspects. All passengers must pass 
through a metal detector and all hand baggage is scanned with an X-ray machine. Sniffer dogs and chemical hand swabs are 
currently used to detect explosives. Explosives detector machines are currently being developed and may well be introduced in 
the future. 
5. Checked baggage passes through large-scale x-ray machines. All bags are kept completely separate from passenger areas in the 
terminal. 
6. Airside' is only access to aircraft area from the terminal is via controlled boarding points only. Ground staffs are submitted to 
background checks. Security pass system limits access to aircraft to only vital personnel and CCTV monitors the aircraft area. 
 
Figure  2.8: Heightened Security Measures in UK Airports [sic] (BBC, 2006) 
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In the US, the Federal Civil Aviation Administration (FAA) also implemented major security 
measures in the 1990s. FAA measures, which were highlighted by Rao and Keith (1999), include 
passenger profiling, positive passenger bag match, trace explosive-detection devices, and 
procedures such as baggage hand searches. In addition, on September 14, 2001, the FAA 
tightened security and implemented new security measures in US airports nationwide. Examples 
of procedures at passenger terminal areas are illustrated in Figure  2.9 (The Washington Post, 
2001). Recently in January 2008, the US Government published a National Aviation Security 
Policy, Strategy, and Mode-Specific Plans. The plan “addresses threats to aviation using a risk-
based methodology to complement the overarching National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP) and seeks to deter and prevent terrorist attacks against aviation, mitigate damage and 
expedite recovery and minimize the impact of an attack to the aviation system.” (Dillon, 2009) 
 
               
Figure  2.9: Security measures in US Airports Post 9/11 (The Washington Post, 2001) 
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Moreover, in Canada, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA, 2006) enforced 
more security measures, as illustrated in Figure  2.10.  Likewise, in Japan, as illustrated in Figure 
 2.11, the security measures were also tightened up to include routine patrols, reinforced 
perimeters with sensors, access control at different gates, airport staff screening, passenger and 
cabin crew screening, hold baggage screening, and x-ray cargo screening. In addition, security 
guards were deployed at access gates, aircraft, and cargo terminal (Manabe, 2006). 
  
 
Figure  2.10: The Airport Terminal Security Environment (CATSA, 2006) 
 
2.5.4 Security Technologies at Airports 
Modern airports are changing their conventional role from being just premises for airplane 
operations and are becoming multidisciplinary business parks. Some scholars are claiming that 
airports are potential models of concurrent enterprises (Kesseler, 2003).  As a result, cutting-edge 
 36
technologies in communication, IT systems, data, control, management, etc; have become an 
urgent necessity for running, maintaining, repairing, controlling, and securing modern airports at 
both the single-airport and multiple-airport levels.  
 
 
Figure  2.11: Overview of Aviation Security Measures at Airports in Japan (Manabe, 2006) 
 
 
The utilization of explosives and nonmetallic weapons has initiated growing levels of security 
threats at airports. These new challenges have encouraged the investigation of new passenger 
screening technologies, including chemical-trace-detection techniques and imaging methods 
(NAS, 1996). Furthermore, the AT explosive-detection systems, x-ray applications, non-ionizing 
radiation, biometrics, and radio frequency identification (RFID) are technologies currently used 
at some airports and that will have wide deployment in the near future. The most commonly used 
and promising security-related technologies are summarized in the following sections. 
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X-Ray Applications 
Automated x-ray technology has been used at airports to scan passengers’ checked baggage in 
order to detect any hidden metal weapons, and consequently prevent potential high-jacking. 
After the blowing up of Pan Am flight 107 over Lockerbee, researchers developed three new 
explosive-detection systems (EDS) based on dual energy x-ray technology, and a fourth one 
based on radio frequency (RF) magnetic resonance technology, with special attention on 
advanced technology explosive-detection systems (ATs) (Rao and Keith, 1999). X-ray scanners 
have been used for a long time in airport security systems, but the side-effects of x-rays 
motivated researchers to explore other safer technologies (Profile, 2005).  
 
AT Explosive Detection Systems 
Some airports in the United States of America use the following examples of AT explosive-
detection systems (Rao and Keith, 1999): 
1. Vivid VIS-M rapid detection systems with a scatter detection enhancement feature. 
2. EG and G Z-Scan 7 dual energy dual view system. 
3. HI-Scan 10065 multi-energy explosive-detection device. 
4. Qscan-500 quadrupole resonance analysis-based explosives-detection device. 
 
Non-ionizing Radiation 
Recent developments have produced a new scanning technology based on what is called 
“terahertz radiation,” which operates with much lower energy and is therefore considered safer 
than x-rays (Profile, 2005).  Recent advancements in pulsed laser and semiconductor technology 
have overcome the ‘‘terahertz gap’’ and have made commercially viable to use terahertz 
Technology in practical applications such as pharmaceutical drug discovery, medical imaging, 
and airport security (Profile, 2005). 
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Biometric 
Is an authentication tool used to verify and identify a person identity through evaluating and 
matching his or her unique “physical and behavioral traits.” Biometric technology is based on 
recognition of “common physical biometrics, including fingerprints; hand or palm geometry; and 
retina, iris, or facial characteristics. Behavioral characteristics include signature, voice (which 
also has a physical component), keystroke pattern, and gait.” (Liu and Silverman, 2001). 
Biometrics applications are becoming the most secure and reliable techniques, because it is hard 
for these identifiers to be borrowed, stolen, or forgotten, and forging one is practically 
impossible (Liu and Silverman, 2001). On the other hand, biometric techniques lack 
standardization among different vendors. In addition, there are variations in accuracies and other 
technical concerns about physical and behavioral biometrics, as depicted in Table  2.7. 
 
Table  2.7: Comparison of Biometrics (Liu and Silverman, 2001) 
 
 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
Cerino and Walsh (2000) referred to RFID as identification technology that automatically 
matches the item being read with its tag. Due to its potential advantages and wide range of 
frequencies it can employ, international co-operative research initiatives between aviation 
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industry partners such as airport authorities, suppliers, and/or air transport companies have been 
carried out. The testing will investigate the expected performance levels of different RFID 
frequencies that have promising functionality for aviation facilities with respect to the 
operational and security facets of passengers’ baggage tracking, sorting, and reconciliation 
(Cerino and Walsh, 2000). Breakthrough technologies can enhance security measures at airports 
and improve overall performance levels by reducing screening and other security check times, 
increasing check productivity, and mitigating threat levels and vulnerability to actions of 
unlawful interference against civil aviation security. 
 
2.5.5 Security Training Programs 
According to several experts, human operators’ abilities to recognize a threat in passengers’ 
luggage are the most critical component in any airport aviation security system (Schwaninger, 
2003). Consequently, successful training of security staff is a cornerstone of any security 
programs. The following are current broadly used training programs (Koller et al., 2007):  
1. X-Ray Tutor (XRT), a computer-based (Schwaninger, 2003). 
2. Threat image projection (TIP) program known as 3i-TIP System. 
3. TIP Multiple Views Library (TIP MVL). 
4.  X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT). 
5.  X-Ray Prohibited Items Test (X-Ray PIT). 
6. X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT). 
7. Theoretical Test on Computer (TEC).  
 
The Security Industry Association (SIA) has reported that airport security is positively correlated 
with the lack of proper security training (SIA, 2008).  For example, in a bomb-detection test 
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carried out by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents at Newark Liberty 
International Airport in the USA, in 20 tests out of 22, the operator failed to detect the bombs 
hidden in the luggage. The test revealed that most scanner machine operators do not pursue 
standard operating procedures in conducting their duties as directed and that they lack adequate 
training to fulfill their responsibilities (Marsico, 2006). This deficiency is being increasingly 
recognized and several authorities as well as airports are planning to increase investment in the 
important element of aviation security: effective and efficient training of screeners. A number of 
computer based training programs are dedicated to this objective.  X-Ray Tutor (XRT) is one of 
the most widely used.  
 
The X-Ray Tutor is being used to investigate potentials of x-ray image tutoring technology for 
aviation security screeners (Schwaninger, 2004). It is employed at 400 US airports, 19 German 
airports, and several airports in other European countries and Asia. The Canadian Air Transport 
Security Authority (CATSA) is also performing extensive testing of X-Ray Tutor at several 
Canadian airports in collaboration with the University of Zurich (UZ, 2006). X-Ray Tutor is 
designed to enhance aviation security screeners’ ability to identify forbidden items within a 
passenger’s baggage as they appear in images produced by x-ray-based screening devices (Koller 
et al., 2007). Schwaninger et al. (2005) claimed that screeners need the ability to deal with two 
main categories of factors influencing x-ray effectiveness: image-based and knowledge-based. 
Hardmeier et al. (2006) argued that image-based factors such as “bag complexity, 
superimposition by other objects, and rotation of objects” are based on visual-cognitive abilities 
and that knowledge-based factor are also relevant to the training screeners.  
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2.6 Risk-Based Security Research  
In recent research government agencies and scholars have investigated a number of areas related 
to airport security risk and vulnerability. Governmental efforts have included, for example, the 
Australian Office of Transport Security (AOTS), who issued an Aviation Risk Context Statement 
(ARCS) in January 2005 (AOTS, 2005). In the USA, the TSA Office of Threat Assessment and 
Risk Management is working with economists to analyze the costs verses the benefits of 
precautionary measures (Jacobson et al., 2003). The TSA is also currently developing a 
Vulnerability Assessment Management System (TVAMS) to collect critical threat and 
vulnerability assessment data (Yalcinkaya, 2005). This research domain is helpful in addressing 
the levels of threats, vulnerability, consequences, of the security systems in airports. 
 
2.6.1 Risk-Based Methodologies 
After Sept. 11 incidents, the aviation security approaches focused on risk-based methodologies 
(Elias, 2008).  To this extent, researchers developed a number of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies to assess threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences in different disciplines.  
According to Stickles et al. (2003), airports confront two distinct sources of threat, the first is 
external threats and the second is internal threats. Within the civil aviation context, as shown in 
Figure  2.12, Elia B. (2008) has defined the relationship between the most important threat 
sources, tactics that can be used by adversaries, and the potential targets. 
 
Weichselgartner (2001) argued that adopting a conceptual approach in vulnerability reduction, in 
any domain, will have positive impacts on diminishing the consequences. This research compiles 
different definitions of vulnerability.  
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Figure  2.12: Aviation Security Threat Sources, Tactics, and Targets (Elias, 2008) 
 
 
In the airport domain, Veatch et al. (1999) studied vulnerability using a scenario-based 
methodology and applied it to two major US airports.  One of the useful aspects of this research 
is the practical formulation of consequence as a function of three parameters: Casualties (F), 
Downtime (U), and Exposure (E), as shown in Equation  2.1. 
 
                                       C= 0.5F + 0.2U + 0.3E                                    2.1 
Where: F… indicates the level of casualties resulting from an adversary act, 
            U… represents the amount of time airport operations are delayed, and 
            E… represents exposure to public 
 
Equation  2.1: Consequence calculation (Veatch et al., 1999) 
This representation is useful in Veatch et al. (1999) research and can be extended to include 
other consequences related to property loss. The consequence scale used in Veatch et al. is 
shown in Table  2.8. Another important result of this research is the development of a relative 
attractiveness scale for aircraft assets as depicted in Table  2.9. This concept can be extended 
further more to include other airport facilities and assets. 
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Table  2.8: Consequence Scale (Veatch et al., 1999) 
 
Level Casualties Facility Downtime Exposure Scale 
Very High > 25 Fatalities > 24 Hours Public Outcry/Dismay 5 
High 11 – 25 Fatalities > 16 – 24 Hours Congressional Mandates 4 
Moderate 
1 -10 Fatalities/  
Multiple injured 
>8 -16 Hours Potential Litigation 3 
Low 1 Person Injured 8 Hours or Less Major Investigation 2 
Very Low No Injuries No Downtime Minor Investigation 1 
 
 
Table  2.9: Relative Attractiveness Scale (Veatch et al., 1999) 
 
Attractiveness Rating Value Typical Examples 
Extremely Attractive 5 Out of service aircraft 
Very Attractive 4 
Aircraft with passengers and an identified threat or 
an air carrier with an identified threat 
Attractive 3 Aircraft with passengers or an operational terminal 
Less Attractive 2 
Passenger aircraft without passengers or support 
services essential for operations 
Unattractive 1 An in-service cargo aircraft or retail operations 
 
 
In more recent research, Dillon et al. (2009) developed an Anti-terrorism Risk-Based Decision 
Aid (ARDA) for assessing the investments of protecting U.S. Navy assets. The research analyzes 
thousands of possible attack scenarios considering 15 attack types, (Figure  2.13), 160 types of 
U.S. Navy facilities and 22 possible countermeasures to mitigate risk taking into account 
interesting ease factor of attack modes as shown in Figure  2.14.  
 
 




Figure  2.14: Possible Attack Modes, (Dillon et al., 2009) 
 
In another effort, Hunt and Kellerman (2007) presented expert system software, Aviation 
Security Risk Assessment Program (CASRAP), to evaluate airport security threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences. Their research quantifies the security risk in terms of dollars 
of asset loss caused by potential threat. They divide the airport into two major areas; physical 




Figure  2.15: CASRAP, (Hunt and Kellerman, 2007) 
 
Accordingly based on frequency, severity of threats, and chances of successful attacks, the tool 
produces a baseline risk expressed in dollars. A summary of other security risk assessment 
research is presented in Table  2.10. 
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Title Author Objective Output/Product Comments 
Airport Vulnerability Assessment 
- An Analytical Approach 
Lazarick R., 
(1998) 
Addresses both the process used to 
conduct “The Airport Vulnerability 
Assessment Project” in the US, as well 
as an unclassified look at the results 
which have been achieved for the initial 
airport assessments. 
Findings resulted from the initial 
airport assessments. 
Countermeasures are commonly 
recommended for security 
improvements. A summary of 
learned lessons. Project status 
and anticipated schedule for the 
next year. 
 
Risk Assessment of Aviation 
Security and Evaluation of 
Aviation Security Policies 
Yalcinkaya, 
R. (2005) 
Addresses possible threats from 
terrorists and criminals against the 
aviation industry and offer possible 
solutions to deal with terrorist and 
criminal attacks, to determine whether 
existing security measures and 
safeguards are adequate or need 
improvement. 
A list of recommended remedies 
was presented, which can be 
evaluated as responses to the 
vulnerabilities of aviation 
security. 
Unavoidable limitations are: 
implementing these policies, 
precautions, and efforts can not 
thoroughly answer performance 
questions; agencies do not explain 
every detail of policies, because 
the concept of security issues is 
highly restricted and confidential; 
and there are limited empirical 
studies. 
A Unified Framework for Risk 
and Vulnerability Analysis 
Covering both Safety and Security 
Aven, T. 
(2006) 
Develop a unified framework for risk 
analysis and management tasks. 
A framework for risk analysis, 
covering both safety and 
security has been defined and 
quantified. The framework is 
based on two dimensions: 
possible consequences and 
associated uncertainties. 
The developed framework is a 
useful approach for assessing risk 
and vulnerability in any system if  
the probabilities and uncertainties 
of this system can be defined. 
 
A Systems Framework for 





Develops a  holistic paradigm for a 
systems framework for safety and 
security. 
 
A systemic and holistic 
framework of seven principles 
with a scalable architecture was 
developed, to suit the safety and 
security assurance at any level 
of perspective and scale. 
 
Risk Assessment of Aviation 





Addresses aviation security risks and 
vulnerability problems, and offers 
possible solutions for eliminating them. 
By using mitigation, means of 
transfer, and acceptance forms 
of risk management, possible 
strategies were presented to 
reduce the impact of risks in 
aviation security.  
The thesis is oriented towards 
policies and strategies related to 
the mitigation of risk and 
vulnerability in aviation security.  
 45 
 46
2.6.2 Simulation and Modeling Studies 
Using simulation techniques helped researchers to develop some decision support tools. In an 
attempt to develop a 2-D spatially aware software for the Transportation Security administration 
(TSA) called Security Checkpoint Optimizer (SCO), Wilson et al. (2006) used the discrete event 
simulation technique. The advantage of the SCO is its graphical interface model that enables 
security personnel to simulate their own passenger screening process. Once the security 
checkpoint(s) layout (Figure  2.16) and process parameters are defined, “SCO simulates 
passenger movement using both path-based and pathless movement algorithms to mimic a semi-
autonomous passenger traversal of a 2-D space. The software is designed to allow analysts to 









Figure  2.16: Two-Lane Security Checkpoint (Wilson et al., 2006) 
 
 
One of the interesting features of this research is the application of security effectiveness in 
terms of the probability (pd), to detect a threat based on the chance of not detecting it by a set of 
equipments at a given checkpoint (which, in fact, is the reliability of those equipments to detect 
specific types of threats through the related security check points), as shown in Equation  2.2. 
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idd pP                                  Equation  2.2 
Where, pd(i) the effectiveness of equipment (i), i.e., the probability of the 
equipment to detect a threat. 
Equation  2.2: Overall Security Effectiveness (Wilson et al., 2006) 
While this representation is useful, this study did not differentiate the types of threats. Also, it 
did not consider multiple checkpoints in the analysis, or separate the analysis for passenger 
versus their cabin baggage and checked-in luggage. These considerations are important and are 
addressed in the present research and included in evaluating the overall terminal security risks. 
 
Other simulation research, Rountree and Demetsky (2006), studied air cargo systems, and four 
security scenarios of cargo flow to test the overall effectiveness, cargo throughput, and evaluated 
the system costs, and the average time taken to process cargo through the facility. This research 
has the potential to be used as a guide by aviation decision makers to upgrade security measures 
in air cargo facilities. 
 
In another research effort, Berkowitz and Bragdon (2006) used a 4-D simulation framework 
(Figure  2.17) to virtually investigate potential methods to deal with safety and security concerns 
in US seaports. The team tested the possible advantages of 4-D and evaluated in a virtual real-
time format (air-land-seaport access) the likely vulnerabilities that might be generated by port 
stakeholders. The developed 4-D technique assisted with the generation of both surface and 
underwater scenarios in the context of seaports. These scenarios will help evaluate different 
events and personnel training situations. Although this technique was developed for port safety 
and security, its principles and logic have potential applications to the analysis of the 
performance of airport security systems. 
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Figure  2.17: Simulation Flow Work [sic] (Berkowitz et al., 2006) 
 
 
Some researchers have used modeling approaches to evaluate and assess airport security. Wilson, 
D. L. (2005) carried out an experimental study to provide a better understanding of new 
technologies and their impact on security systems in an airport’s operational environment. The 
study modeled the passenger and carry-on baggage screening process to provide comprehensive 
guidelines on how simulation modeling can help to evaluate, assess, and fine-tune equipment 
selection and other operational factors in passenger and baggage security check-points. 
The operational research approach also was used by Martonosi, S. E. (2005) to develop 
mathematical models to address prominent problems in aviation security related to Computer 
Aided Pre-screening Systems (CAPPS) and Secure Flight systems. The research presented a 
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review of some security risk assessment policies, synthesis of literature, discussion, use of 
approximate dynamic programming methods for allocating security checkpoints and cost-wise 
choices. Based on practical operational data and hypothetical modeling assumptions, the research 
states that quantitative methods were found to be helpful tools for shedding light on some of the 
intricacies of aviation security issues. 
 
Jacobson, et al. (2003) adopted a case-study approach to model passengers and their baggage 
operational procedures though the baggage screening security systems at airport terminals. In an 
attempt to answer how and where to assign the required screening devises, and measure how 
effective are they, the research investigates how discrete optimization techniques can help 
decision makers to optimally deploy the measures of a baggage security screening system. The 
research quantifies the effectiveness of baggage screening security device systems based on 
identifying three performance measures. Those measures are: (1) Uncovered Flight Segments 
(UFS), which quantifies number of uncovered flights, (2) Uncovered Passenger Segments (UPS), 
which quantifies number of passengers on uncovered flights, and (3) Uncovered Baggage 
Segments (UBS) which quantifies number of unscreened selected bags. The optimization model 
included some deployment constraints on a set of fights, such as, the number of un-cleared 
passengers, the number of flights, and the size of the aircraft. 
 
Hessami, A. G. (2004) applied an empirical investigation approach, by investigating number of 
airlines accidents, to propose a new paradigm for holistic systems assurance, and developed a 
systems framework for safety and security. The new framework is based on two fundamental 
facets: safety performance and the security vulnerabilities. The research, within the context of 
organization and learning, categorized and describes seven systemic assurance principles (Figure 
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 2.1); which are: Proactivity, Prevention, Protection, Preparedness, Recovery, Organization and 
Learning, and Continual Enhancement; and argued that these principles are the foundation for 
any systemic and holistic approach to safety and security assurance.  
 
2.6.3 Security Management Systems 
Various researchers have introduced security management systems to various applications. 
Based on a survey and scenario approach, Tzannatos E. S. (2003) developed a Decision Support 
System (DSS) for the Promotion of Security in Shipping. As depicted in Figure  2.18, the author 
structured the research to develop a DSS that relays of a DSS-resident database of all relevant 












Figure  2.18: DSS structure (Tzannatos, 2003)  
 
 
To assess the risks, the research adopted three risk factors as the basis for DSS investigations and 
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likelihood that an attempt will be successful (exploited vulnerabilities), and severity of its 
consequences (impact significance of the asset loss). The research generally has three major 
phases: (1) Risk assessment phase, which threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences are assessed; 
(2) Setting acceptable levels of risk phase, which defines the threshold of accepted risk level; and 
(3) Security control and planning phase, in which countermeasures and cost-effective mitigation 















Figure  2.19: DSS Methodology (Tzannatos, 2003) 
 
Among research features, was the use of five quantitative risk factors assessment levels based on 
a subjective expert judgment that assigns scores 1- 5 for each risk factor (threats, vulnerabilities, 
and consequences), and a scale of 1 – 125 to quantify overall risk. The DSS executes a detailed 
comparison among the constituent factors of risk to detect the conditionally acceptable scenarios 
and produces a security risk matrix, which informs the user about the scenarios allocated to the 
various risk levels and their corresponding vulnerabilities, thus, being prime candidates of 
security optimization. The DSS initiates a risk re-assessment to arrive to the risk optimized 
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Using discussion and case-study approach, Corazzola and Poli (2003) developed an improved 
Decision-Making approach through Effective Asset Management. The research furnishes 
engineering and public works planners with tools for making condition assessment-based 
decisions and utilizing features of GIS systems. The author reviewed and synthesized literature, 
and overviewed real-life examples of municipalities. The research results include guidelines for 
designing a customized condition assessment strategy that will meet the needs of a given 
organization, and addresses that the developed strategy has potential uses and application in 
other infrastructure areas. 
 
Vose D. (2008) in his book “Risk Analysis: A Quantitative Guide”, presented a comprehensive 
background on risk analysis in the first part of the book. While, in the second part he devoted it 
to risk analysis distributions, modeling and simulation, and forecasting processes. The book 
highlights the process of risk analysis modeling and global optimization methods. As depicted in 
Figure 2.20, the book describes a road map to develop a risk assessment metric that can be 









Figure  2.20: Vose (2008) Book General Structure 
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Some advantages of the book are: useful Spreadsheet examples along with related programming 
code, introduces the use of Monte-Carol simulation in risk applications, and discusses the most 
common risk modeling errors. Other example of security management systems, risk assessment 
software, and benchmarking research are depicted in Tables 2.11 and 2.12. 
 
2.7 Summary 
Aviation security is an essential requirement to airports. Airports are becoming more demanding 
of society’s vital dynamic assets in the transportation infrastructure and will benefit from 
emerging infrastructure management systems; therefore, any asset management system for an 
airport should include aviation security as one of its objectives. Since the 1960s, aviation safety 
and security has caught the attention of governments and international agencies, but airports have 
continued to be targeted by different adversaries worldwide. Following the 9/11 attacks, in 
response to these incidents, ICAO published Annex 17 and started USAP, both of which aim to 
promote safeguard civil aviation operations against acts of unlawful interference. Consequently, 
the attention of airport authorities has been refocused to airport risk-based security management 
systems and assessment methodologies, especially, since 2005 when the US aviation 
infrastructure and the security of America's critical infrastructure were graded at D+ and I, 
respectively. Recently, researchers have begun to develop qualitative and quantitative risk-based 
methodologies to assess the three risk dimensions: threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. 
Although, a number of quantitative risk-based research studies have been carried out in the area 
of airport security systems; however, research gaps can be listed as follows: 
1- No research has been found on asset management for airport security systems as defined 
by ICAO’s Annex 17, particularly for international airports terminals. 
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- Specifically oriented to security   
  environment. 
- Provides pertinent formats for security  
  checklists & surveys.  
-Provides an inclusive reference for risk  
  analysis methodologies and cost/benefit   
  analysis. 
- The book introduces systematically the  
  concept of comprehensive emergency   
  management (mitigation, preparedness,  
  response, and recovery). 
 
 
- Useful and practical    
   security checklists and  
   surveys. 
- Provide professional risk  
   analysis examples. 
- Illustrates Technical  
  specifications of some   








The process examines five variable functions: 
1. Specific Assets to be protected (value) 
2. Potential Threats to the various assets 
3. Vulnerabilities that would allow the threats to     materialize 
4. Kinds of Losses that the threats could cause 




- Multiple application software. 
- Links risk assessment results with    
  financial data or without, and with  
  Return on Investment Data or w/o. 
- Widely used and tested by various   
  clients. 
- Quantifies risk and provides ROI metric  
   based on the safeguards selected. 
- Automatically generates a complete  
  management-ready case summary  
  report. 
- Threats are categorized as: natural  
  disasters, criminal activity, terrorism,  
  theft, and systems failures. 
- Contains more than 160 controls, with  
   default values for implementation, and  
   life cycles. 
 
- Claims that it reduces  
   needed for Risk Analysis  
   by 70%. 
- Customizable software. 
- Has a Web-Based surveys  
  tool. 
- Runs mitigation strategies. 
- Produce assessment data   
   supported with graphics,  
   charts, and quantitative  
    measures. 
- Software purchase and  
   training are needed. 
 
Risk analysis and the 
security survey 
Emergency management 
& business continuity 
planning 
The treatment and 


















samples  54 
 55
Table  2.12: Example of Security Benchmarking Research 
 















Identifies the impact 
government services 
and measures, and 
national and 
international 
legislation in the field 
of security and border 
control have on the 
costs and the quality 
of the passenger-
handling process.  
Meetings with relevant 
stakeholders; visits to 
airports; and directed 
survey. 
A Findings Report was 
presented. 
There were difficulties in 
collecting some vital 
information due to the 




















Examines the use of 
best practice 
benchmarking as an 
approach to 
performance 
improvement in the 
airline industry. 
Benchmarking study 
based on case-study 
approach. 
A range of benchmarking 
issues were highlighted, and 
factors that are likely to 
increase the adoption of 
benchmarking 
as a route to competitiveness 
were also identified. 
The idea of benchmarking 
is becoming widely used 
as an empirical approach 
to evaluating the current 
status of any item, 
system, organization, etc., 
















Develops a rating 
system that balances 
user priorities for 
sustainability versus 
security for better 
building design. 
Review of comparative 
literature as basis for 
developing the new 
model 
A decision matrix model. The user can add new 
items and change the 
weighing scheme. Future 
development indicates the 
possible utilization of 



















Explores the use of 
best practice 
benchmarking in civil 
aviation. 
Questionnaire surveys 
of the top 200 airlines 
and the top 200 
airports; and interviews 
with airline and airport 
managers. 
The surveys revealed a very 
high utilization of 
benchmarking through a series 




2- Most research has focused on a scenario approaches, and didn’t deal with security issue at 
airport in terms of combinations of defined systems, such as passenger and cabin baggage 
screening system, access control system, etc. 
3- Most studies did not consider threat sources in terms of passengers, cabin baggage, and 
checked-in luggage, and accordingly, assess vulnerabilities and consequences based on 
probabilities not to detect the potential threats (i.e., equipment’s effectiveness to detect 
the concerned threats). 
4- Performance measures have been concerned mostly with the overall service quality at 
airports, not the broader aspects dimensions of security systems.  
5- Most research security effectiveness was inputs based on relative probability of detecting 
certain threats based on security subject matter experts. 
6- Although previous research attempted to measure security risk quantitatively and some 
upgrade countermeasures that can be compared with respect to cost and gained benefit 
based on pair-comparison or prioritization approaches, they do not include detailed 
airport oriented quantitative assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequence. 
7- Most of previous airport security assessment methodologies lack risk-based security 
decision support systems and non-traditional techniques-based optimization model for 
Passenger and Cabin Baggage Screening System, to provide guidelines for optimum 
upgrade strategy.  
 
The gaps mentioned above and the crucial need for a security risk-based framework create a 
need for a decision support system that will help airport officials easily assess the status of 
their airports’ security systems quantitatively, satisfy standards and system’s constraints, and 
efficiently allocate financial resources in order to improve security levels. 
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CHAPTER 3  
SECURUTY RISK METRIC 
3.1 Introduction 
For many years, risk assessment studies in civil aviation were directed at safety and aircraft 
accidents. However, after the events of September 11, 2001, the focus of most security-related 
risk assessment has shifted to threats, vulnerabilities, and their consequences. Based on the 
literature review in chapter 2, this chapter presents the development of a metric for quantitatively 
assessing the security risk at an airport. The metric can be used to evaluate the security risk both 
at the level of all security systems and also at the level of the whole airport level. The metric 
involves a methodological assessment for quantifying the three dimensions of risk: threats, 
vulnerability, and consequences. The metric assesses and considers the overall security risk at 
international airport terminals based on threats arise from passengers, cabin baggage, and 
checked-in luggage. Later chapters present the use of the developed metric for developing a risk-
based optimization model that can optimize upgrades to airport security systems.  
 
3.2 Dimensions of Airport Security  
 
The ICAO definition of civil aviation security and the definitions of risk found in the literature 
were used as the basis of a comprehensive approach for deriving a definition of airport security 
risk assessment and for determining its dimensions: threats, vulnerabilities, and their 






Figure  3.1: Dimensions of Security Risk (Google Images, 2009) 
Vulnerability External Threats Consequences 
* Threat Extent 
* Threat Type 
* Airport-Related: 
   - Security System Type 
   - Level of Upgrade 
* Better Security Upgrade 
    = Threats reduction + Less Vulnerability + Less Consequences 
    = Less Risk 
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According to civil aviation security definition of the ICAO, this research defines airport risk 
assessment as the in-place security measures (including human, physical, and non-physical 
resources) for detecting, deterring, mitigating airport threats, and for diminishing vulnerabilities 
in order to safeguard airports against acts of unlawful interference (ICAO, 2002). This research 
deals with the assessment of the security risk to the passenger and cabin baggage screening 
system, as one of the seven airport security systems (ICAO, 2002b) at the airport terminal level, 
as defined by ICAO Annex 17. Brief highlights of the three dimensions of security risk dealt 
with in this research follow: 
 
3.2.1 Threats 
According to Elias (2008) and Stickles et al. (2003), sources of security threats can originate 
either internally (e.g., theft, smuggling, vandalism) or externally (e.g., criminals, extremists, 
terrorists). Since the proposed framework focuses on airport security, it deals with only terrorist-
related external threats because most other threats can be handled by the local airport police 
force, and are not the direct responsibility of airport security. In general, however, a threat can be 
defined as “any indication, circumstance, or event with the potential to cause loss or damage to 
an asset.” Another definition of a threat is “the intention and capability of an adversary to 
undertake actions that would be detrimental to valued assets.” (API/NPRA, 2004) 
 
As defined in Tzannatos (2003) and API/NPRA (2004), a threat can have five levels, ranging 
from “none” to “very high.” “None” means that no action on the part of the adversary is expected 
at all; therefore, an attack will not occur. In contrast, a “very high” level means continuous or 
intensive attacks are likely, and the adversary has the intention and the capabilities of launching 
an attack that would have destructive consequences. Table 3.1 provides a detailed description of 
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each of the six threat levels, along with a related threat score. A threat level is defined in this 
research as the level of the likelihood that a potential threat will occur. Therefore, the levels 
selected by security experts reflect their assessment of the level of likelihood that threats will 
occur. Threats levels are assessed with respect passengers, cabin baggage, and checked-in 
luggage, and the associated risks are quantified accordingly. 
 
Table  3.1: Threat Rating Criteria (based on API/NPRA, 2004; Tzannatos, 2003) 
 
Level Threat description Score
Very High 
Identifies a credible threat to airport assets, so that continuous or intensive attacks are likely 
to occur, and that the adversary demonstrates the capability and intention of launching an 
attack targeting the airport or one of its assets on a frequently occurring basis, and 
specialized security advice should be sought 
5 
High 
Identifies a credible threat to airport assets based on knowledge of the adversary's capability 
and intention of attacking airport assets that involve high levels of expertise, resources, and 




Identifies a possible threat to airport assets based on the adversary’s desire, limited expertise, 
resources, or opportunity to compromise similar assets. 
3 
Low 
Identifies random low-level subversion threats to airport assets, with few known adversaries 
who would pose a threat to airport assets, involving low levels of expertise and resources 
2 
Very Low 
Identifies an attack is unlikely to occur or that there is credible evidence of capability or 
intent, with no history of actual or planned threats against airport assets 1 
None No threats 0 
 
Threats are not identical in all airports but different at hub airports, international airports, and 
domestic airports. In addition to local sources of threats, the occurrence of a threat is also 
influenced by other regions in the world that experience high levels of risk because the airport 
concerned is the final destination of travellers from such regions. Therefore, passengers, their 
cabin baggage, and their checked-in luggage that are carried by airliners originating from high-
risk regions should also be considered as possible sources of threat.  
 
3.2.2 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is one of the key dimensions of risk, and can generally be defined as “any 
weakness that can be exploited by an adversary to gain unauthorized access and subsequent 
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destruction or theft of an asset.” (API/NPRA, 2004) Within the context of an airport, 
vulnerability represents the inability of a security system to apply effective mitigation measures, 
i.e., inability to detect, deter, delay, and respond to threats. Vulnerability can be the result of any 
weakness or deficiency in the system’s management practices (policies and rules); equipment 
and devices; and operational security practices (design, specifications, and procedures). 
 
As with threats, vulnerability has also six extended levels that are based on Tzannatos (2003) and 
API/NPRA (2004), ranging from “None” to “very high.” A vulnerability level of “none” means 
no chance of an adversary affecting airport assets, even by the most intensive attacks. On the 
other hand, “very high” vulnerability means that no effective or reliable means of mitigation are 
in place, and the adversary can easily plot a destructive attack against the airport. Table 3.2 
shows the expanded description of the six levels of vulnerability and their associated scores. 
 
Table  3.2: Vulnerability Rating Criteria (API/NPRA, 2004; Tzannatos, 2003) 
 
Level Vulnerability description Score
Very High 
Identifies that there are no effective protective measures currently in place to deter, detect, delay, 
and respond to the threat, so an adversary can successfully attack the airport assets at any time 
5 
High 
Identifies that there are some protective measures to deter, detect, delay, or respond to the threat, 
but not a complete or effective application of these security strategies, so it would be relatively easy 
for the adversary to successfully attack the airport asset, and a limited opportunity and little 
specialized knowledge would be needed 
4 
Medium 
Identifies that there is no complete and effective application of these security strategies, so an 
attacker with moderate levels of resource and skill could be expected to exploit the identified 
vulnerabilities of the airport asset, and the existing countermeasures could likely be compromised 
3 
Low 
Identifies residual vulnerabilities so that at least one weakness exists that an adversary having high 
level of resource and skill would be capable of exploiting with some effort in order to evade or 
defeat the countermeasure 
2 
Very Low 
Indicates that no residual vulnerabilities to the threat exist and that the chances that the most 
intensive adversary would be able to exploit the airport asset are very low 
1 
None No vulnerabilities 0 
3.2.3  Consequences 
Consequences are an important dimension of risk; they are the result of successful attacks and 
exploited vulnerabilities. Consequences have been defined as “the amount of detrimental impact, 
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losses, fatalities or damages experienced by an airport asset given that a successful attack has 
occurred” (AICE/CCPS, 2002; Tzannatos, 2003). 
 
Veatch et al. (1999) quantified the consequences of a successful threat in terms of three aspects: 
number of fatalities, downtime in number of hours; and level of exposure to the public. Other 
researchers (e.g., Hunt and Kellerman, 2001; RiskWatch, 2008; etc.) also include the cost of 
damage to the physical asset (as a percentage of the total replacement cost) as part of the 
consequences. This research considers four aspects of consequences. Table  3.3 shows the levels 
of consequence and the associated fatalities, downtime, public exposure, damage level, and 
scores. 











Very High > 50 Fatalities > 48 Hours Public Outcry/Dismay 75% -100% 5 
High 25 - 50 Fatalities 24 - 48 Hours Congressional Mandates 50% - 75% 4 
Medium 11 - 25 Fatalities 16 - 24 Hours Potential Litigation 25% - 50% 3 
Low 1-10 Fatalities 8 - 16 Hours Major Investigation 10% - 25% 2 
Very Low 1-5 person injured < 8 Hours Minor Investigation 1% - 10% 1 
None No Injuries 0  Hours No Exposure No Damage 0 
 
3.3 Airport Security Systems 
 
To design a security metric, useful security documentations were obtained from ICAO 
Headquarters in Montreal to be used for research purposes. The provisions in the ICAO’s Annex 
17 (ICAO, 2002b) for security systems and the Security Audit Reference Manual (ICAO, 2002c) 
were both used for the design of the metric. The seven airport security systems as defined by the 
ICAO are as follows: 
1. Organization and Administration  
2. Access Control 
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3. Passenger and Cabin Baggage Screening 
4. Hold Baggage Security 
5. In-Flight Security 
6. Cargo and Catering  
7. Responses to Unlawful Interference and Contingency Arrangements 
 
Due to the wide scope of these security systems, the proposed metric focuses only on the 
passenger and cabin baggage screening system (PCBSS); however, the metric has been designed 
to be flexible so that other systems can be included in future research. 
 
3.4 Airport Security Metric 
As shown in Figure  3.2, the new security metric can be used to provide a risk index for each 
airport security system, through a detailed risk assessment of each system, and for an airport as a 
whole. Since the metric focuses on the PCBSS, the security risk index produced by the metric 







Figure  3.2: Risk-Based Security Metric 
 
 
The typical PCBSS in a typical airport terminal consists of a set of security checkpoints (SCPs) 
that can be equipped with a variety of countermeasures options (devices, equipment, and 
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the others, and each SCP operates based on a specific probability that type of security breach is 
going to happen. For the airport terminal to be vulnerable, the threat must pass through the entire 
set of independent SCPs. Thus, the overall effectiveness of the PCBSS depends on the 
thoroughness and reliability of the component of the system (countermeasures at the various 
SCPs) in detecting and deterring any threat. Therefore, the more sophisticated the security 
measures at a specific SCP, the less vulnerable the system. 
It is possible to represent the vulnerability of a system, based on the independence of the SCPs, 
using mathematical representation. According to the special multiplication rule for independent 
events (Walpole and Myers, 1993), when two events A and B are independent, then the 
probability of both of them happening (that is, the vulnerability) is the product of their 
independent probabilities of occurring (vulnerabilities) (Equation  3.1), as follows: 
                              )(*)()( BPAPBAP                               Equation  3.1 
Equation  3.1: The Special Multiplication Rule for Two Interdependent Events (Walpole and Myers, 1993) 
For multiple events E1, E2, E3, ..., En, the overall probability of all of them occurring can be 
calculated using Equation  3.2, as follows: 







in EPEEEP                            Equation  3.2    
Equation  3.2: The Special Multiplication Rule for Two Interdependent Events (Walpole and Myers, 1993) 
For example, assume two SCPs A and B are 99% and 98% effective respectively, in detecting a 
specific threat. The chances of both pieces of equipment not detecting a threat are, thus, also the 
chance of the airport being vulnerable (i.e., both SCPs not detecting the threat equals P(A  B)), 
as follows: 
0002.0)98.01()99.01()(*)()(  BPAPBAP   
Therefore, based on the same principle of independence used by Wilson and Roe (2006), who 
developed a Security Checkpoint Optimizer, and considering the approach of Jacobson et al. 
(2003) to quantifying the effectiveness of baggage screening security device systems based on 
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identifying three performance measures (including passengers, baggage, and flights), Equations 
3.1 and 3.2, it is possible to carry out a full risk assessment of the PCBSS by evaluating the three 
security dimensions: threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Since threats and consequences 
are uncontrollable whereas vulnerabilities are controllable, the metric assesses the vulnerabilities 
of PCBSS and the risks of each type of security threat at the level of the SCP component with 
respect to passengers, carry-on baggage, and checked-in luggage. Therefore, the risk assessment 
can be addressed as follows. 
3.4.1 Threat Assessment 
Based on the literature investigation (e.g., Figure  2.12) and discussion with airport officials, the 
types of threats that apply to the passengers and cabin baggage screening system can be divided 
into three main categories: explosives, sharp blades, and biological attacks. Each category is 
further subdivided into a number of levels called threat types. The threat categories and their 
types are defined in Table  3.4. These threats are assessed according to the threat levels shown in 
Table 3.1 and scored on a scale from 0 to 5. 
Table  3.4: Threat Categories and Their Types 
 
1.0 Explosives 2.0 Sharp blades 3.0 Biological Attacks 
    
   1.1 Weapons 
   1.2 Bombs 
   1.3 Explosive Liquids 
     
  2.1 Knives 
  2.2 Swords 
  2.3 Razors and Cutters 
      
   3.1 Choking 
   3.2 Nerve 
   3.3 Blood 
   3.4 Blister 
3.4.2 Vulnerability Assessment 
The passenger and cabin baggage screening system in any airport terminal is typically split into 
two subsystems: departure and arrival. Each of these subsystems has its own security 
checkpoints (SCP), known as screening stations, as listed in Table  3.5. According to the size and 
function of the airport, the sequence, the number, and type of departure and arrival security 
checkpoints may differ from one terminal to another.  
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Table  3.5: Security Checkpoints in an Airport Terminal 
 
Subsystem Checkpoint 1 Checkpoint 2 Checkpoint 3 Checkpoint 4 Checkpoint 5 
Departure Curbside/Precheck-in Airline check-in Checked luggage Central gate Boarding 
Arrival Deplaning Gate Passport control In-bond baggage Transferred baggage Hold baggage 
 
3.4.3 Consequence Assessment  
In any threat category, each type of threat has a potential consequence that is likely to occur.  In 
this research, the assessment principle used by Veatch et al. (1999) has been extended, as 
follows. The consequences are represented in terms of the number of fatalities, the number of 
hours of downtime, the amount of public exposure, and the dollar value of the physical damage 
(percentage of the total replacement cost).  Table  3.6 illustrates the four types of potential 
consequences and their assigned impact weight (w). It should be noted that the category of 
physical damage to the asset has been given a weight of 20 % based on an input from an airport 
security expert at the Greater Toronto Airport Authority (GTAA), while the remaining 80% was 
redistributed among casualties, downtime, and exposure based on the percentages used by 
Veatch et al. (1999).  
Table  3.6: Aspects and Weights of Consequences 
 
Casualties Downtime Exposure Asset Physical Damage 
Number of fatalities Hours of downtime Public exposure 
Dollar value of physical damage as 
percentage of the total loss 
40% 15% 24% 20% 
 
3.4.4 Security Risk Index 
One of the paramount objectives of this research is to develop a security risk index (SRI), which 
would function as a quantitative indicator of the security risk at an airport. When the SRI is used 
at multiple levels, it can also be regarded as a useful tool for comparing different SRIs for 
subsystems, systems, and single or multiple airports. Based on the approaches of Tzannatos 
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(2003), Guthrie et al. (2005), and Sylvie (2005), the overall SRI is determined as the product of 
the overall threat (Ts), vulnerability (Vs), and consequence (Cs) of a system, according to 
Equation  3.3. 
           SRIs = Threat (Ts)  Vulnerability (Vs)  Consequence (Cs)    Equation  3.3 
Equation  3.3: Security Risk Index 
With respect to the PCBSS, the developed security risk metric extends the risk evaluation of 
Wilson and Roe’s (2006) approach for one security checkpoint so that multiple checkpoints can 
be considered and so that the risks associated with passengers (P), cabin baggage (B), and check-
in luggage (L) can be separated. To facilitate the analysis, a database of various mitigation 
measures was created that includes information about the reliability and the cost of each 
mitigation measure for detecting each type of threat. Some the information applies to passengers 
only, and some applies to cabin baggage, checked-in luggage, or a combination. The database 
entries for reliability and cost information) are based on input from airport security experts. 
 
Threat Analysis 
Figure  3.3 illustrates the types of threats that are common to a passenger and cabin baggage 
screening system. For example, each type of threat is assessed based on user input with respect to 
the likelihood of that threat occurring. Accordingly, the threat level for each category J is defined 
as the average of all the types of threat in that category. Therefore, the overall system threat (Ts) 
can be calculated as follows:  



























s                                Equation  3.4                 
 
Where Ts   is the overall system threat level (0-5) 
            J    is the number of threat categories 
            nj   is the is number of threat types in threat category j 
            tji   is the assessment of threat type i in threat category j. 















The basic concept introduced in this research is to assess the vulnerability of each threat type 
separately based on extending the Wilson and Roe (2006) approach (Equation 2.2 in Chapter 2). 
Figure  3.4 shows the extension of the approach for each component separately: passengers (P), 
cabin baggage (B), and checked-in luggage (L). Therefore, the first step was to build a database 
of a variety of security measures (devices/equipment/measures) and along with their reliability in 
detecting various types of threats. The analysis can then consider the probability of the threat not 
being detected through multiple checkpoints. Because checkpoints (SCPjs) within a subsystem, 
i.e., departures or arrivals at a specific terminal, have different equipment (measures) that 
considers either passengers, luggage, or baggage, consider the measures that screen passengers in 
this subsystem can be considered as p1, p2, …, P, those that screen cabin baggage as b1, b2, …, B, 
and those that screen luggage as l1, l2, …, L. Therefore, the vulnerability of measures for 
passengers, for example, is the probability of not detecting a specific type of threat t while the 
passengers (p) are passing through all security checkpoints SCP1, SCP2 and SCPj in the 
subsystem under consideration. Therefore, the total vulnerability with respect to passengers (Vtp)  
Weapons 
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in any subsystem can be calculated as follows: 












tpitp RV                             Equation  3.5 
Where Vtp   is the vulnerability of the passengers measures to threat type t in a subsystem j 
            Rtpi is the reliability of the passenger measure i for detecting threat type t 
            P    is the number of passengers measures for detecting threat type t 
            t     is the threat type t 
Equation  3.5: Vulnerability of Passengers to introduce tpth Threat Type 
Similarly, the vulnerability of security checkpoints (SCP1,… , SCPj) with respect to cabin 
baggage is as follows: 












tbitb RV                                          3.6 
 
Where Vtb    is the vulnerability of the cabin baggage measures to threat type t in a subsystem j,  
            Rtbi  is the reliability of the passenger measure i for detecting threat type t,  
            B     is the number of cabin baggage measures for detecting threat type t,  
            t      is the threat type t  
Equation  3.6: Vulnerability of Passengers to introduce tbth Threat Type 
Likewise, the vulnerability of security check point (SCP1, … , SCPj) with respect to checked-in 
luggage is as follows: 












tlitl RV                                 Equation  3.7    
 
Where Vtl     is the vulnerability of the checked-in luggage measures to threat type t in a subsystem j       
            Rtli  is the reliability of the passenger measure i for detecting threat type t 
            L     is the number of cabin checked-in luggage measures for detecting threat type t 
            t      is the threat type t  
Equation  3.7: Vulnerability of Passengers to introduce tlth Threat Type 
Consequently, the overall vulnerability Vt of any subsystem (either departures or arrivals) to 
threat type t is as follows: 







                                              Equation  3.8                   
Equation  3.8: Overall Vulnerability of kth subsystem towards tpth threat type 
Based on Equations 3.5 to 3.8, the vulnerability of the overall system to threat type t (SVt) can be 
expressed by considering all the total average of all k subsystems, as follows:  









 1                                                           Equation  3.9                 
Equation  3.9: Overall Vulnerability of kth subsystem towards the threat type 
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Accordingly, when all threat types are considered, the overall vulnerability of the system (Vs) can 
be expressed as follows: 









 1                                                        Equation  3.10 
where T   is the total number of threats in all threat categories 
Equation  3.10: PCBSS Overall Vulnerability introduced by all tth Threat categories 
The overall vulnerability of the PCBSS to a single threat type and to multiple threats is illustrated 















Depending on its specific characteristics, each threat type t has a specific level of consequence 
for each of the four types of consequence (casualties, downtime, exposure, total loss). For 
example, a high “knives” threat is expected to have significantly fewer casualties than even a 
very low “bombs” threat. Therefore, the assessment of consequences must be appropriate for  
each type of threat.  The overall  system  consequence  Cs  can then  be  averaged  in  hierarchical  
Overall Departures 
Vulnerability Score 




Weapons Explosive Liquids 
Explosives  
Score
Bombs Knives Razors & Cutters







order at the system level, as follows: 














                                 Equation  3.11 
 where      Cti     is user input of the consequence of threat t
 in consequence category i 
                 Wi   is the weight (importance) of the consequence category i 
                 Cci  is number of the consequence categories 
                 T     is number of threat types in all threat categories 









Figure  3.5: PCBSS Consequence Scoring Scheme 
 
Security Risk Index 
Based on Equation  3.3, security risk indexes (SRIs) are calculated separately at the level of a 
single threat type t for passengers, cabin baggage, and check-in luggage, and then the overall 
security risk index for all t are averaged for the subsystem and system levels. For example, the 
security risk index of the threat type t with respect to passengers at all checkpoints SCP1, SCP2, 
and SCPj is the total SRIjtp in a subsystem, which can be calculated using as follows: 
                                        ss
J
j




                       Equation  3.12 
where      SRIjtp   is the SRI of all threat types t with respect to passengers at all SCPs (J) in a subsystem 
             Ts           is the overall system-level threat  
             Cs          is the overall system-level consequence  













Overall Consequence Score  
Weapons Explosive Liquids Bombs Knives Razors & cutters Swords Choking BlisterBlood Nerve 
 71
Similarly, the SRI of the security checkpoints (SCP1,… , SCPj) with respect to cabin baggage can 
expressed simply, as follows: 
                                             ss
J
j




                                        Equation  3.13 
where      SRIjtb is the SRI of all threat types t with respect to cabin baggage at all SCPs (J) in a subsystem 
             Ts         is the overall system-level threat 
             Cs        is the overall system-level consequence  
Equation  3.13: The SRI of Cabin Baggage to introduce tbth Threat Type 
 
Likewise, the SRI of security checkpoint (SCP1,… , SCPj) with respect to checked-in luggage is 
expressed as follows: 
                                              ss
J
j




                                        Equation  3.14 
Where      SRIjtl   is the SRI of all threat types t with respect to luggage at all SCPs (J) in a subsystem 
             Ts           is the overall system-level threat  
             Cs          is the overall system-level consequence  
Equation  3.14: The SRI of Checked-in Luggage to introduce tlth Threat Type 
 
 
Consequently, the overall SRI of the kth subsystem (either departures or arrivals) of the PCBSS at 
an airport terminal towards tth threat type is as follows: 






                                     Equation  3.15                   
Equation  3.15: Overall SRI of kth subsystem towards tth threat type 
 
Based on Equations 3.12 to 3.15, the SRI for the overall system with respect to tth threat type can 
be expressed as follows:  









 1                                                   Equation  3.16                 
where   SRItk    is the overall SRI of a subsystem k with respect to threat type t 
Equation  3.16: Overall SRI of kth subsystem towards tth threat type 
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Accordingly, the SRI for the overall system with respect to all T threat types can be expressed as 
follows: 









 1                                            Equation  3.17 
where   SRIs    is overall SRI of the s
th security system for all threat categories 
             SRIt     is the overall SRI of s
th system for threat type t 
Equation  3.17: PCBSS Overall SRI introduced by all Tth Threat categories 
 
Once the overall SRIs are calculated for each of the airport’s security systems, and based on the 
hierarchical summation of the SRI for an ith airport proposed by Berbash et al. (2008), an SRI 
calculation map (Figure  3.6) can be developed, and the overall SRI for the airport can be 
computed, as follows: 






 1                              Equation  3.18 
where     SRI    is the security risk index of the airport 
               SRIs   is the security risk index of S security system 
Equation  3.18: Airport overall SRI  
 
 
Among the advantages of the SRI is the fact that it can be used to identify overall improvements 
in security risk mitigation, which is defined in this research as the Security Upgrade Benefit (Bsu). 
The Bsu can be determined by computing the difference between the initial SRI before the system 
is upgraded and SRI after the system is upgraded, as shown in Equation  3.19. The Bsu can be 
useful as a measure for comparing upgrade decisions. 
 
                                           baselineupgradesu SRISRIB            Equation  3.19 
Equation  3.19: Overall Security Risk Improvement 
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3.4.5 Using the Security Metric 
Based on the rating criteria for threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessment, as were 
illustrated in Tables 3.1 through 3.3 respectively, the metric assigns a score from 0-5 that 
corresponds to each level of assessed threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Different overall of 
security risk index (SRI) scores for an airport represent unique scenarios for combinations of 
threat, vulnerability, and consequences. As a result, the respective lower and upper limits of a 
security risk index for an airport are 0, which means no security risk exists, or 111=1, which is 
the lowest level, and 555=125, which is the highest level. Table  3.7 shows the basis on which 
the overall security risks index categories and their associated levels should be interpreted nd the 
categories into which security risk assessment scenarios will fall. 
Table  3.7: SRI Categories and their Levels 
 
Score Category 
0 - 5 Acceptable 
6 - 25 Very Low 
26 - 50 Low 
51 - 75 Medium 
76 - 100 High 
101 - 125 Very High 
  
Furthermore, according to the extended Veatch et al. (1999), Tzannatos (2003) and API/NPRA 
(2004) approaches, one of the essential milestones in security management is to establish an 
adequate SRI score, which is in fact, the acceptable risk level, after all possible mitigation 
measures have been applied based on different risk scenarios. The acceptable risk level for this 
research is defined to be within the “Acceptable” category, as illustrated in Table  3.7, which 
quantitatively means that the SRI score ranges from 0 to 5. It should be noted that airports are 
subject to diverse threat categories and types; therefore, the acceptable security risk index range 
(0-5) differs from one airport to another because the assessment of risk can be subject to the 






Figure  3.6: SRI Calculation Map for the Subsystem, System, and Airport Levels
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The SRI score represents possible outcomes of the assessment of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence. In terms of threat status, vulnerability status, and consequences, the assessment can 
be interpreted as the number of fatalities, the hours of downtime, the amount of public exposure, 
and the dollar value of physical damage (percentage of the total replacement cost). For example, 
if the overall SRI score for an airport is 67, according to Table  3.7, the score falls within the 
“Medium” category (51-75). Table 3.8 interprets the score of 67 based on the threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence rating criteria listed in Tables 3.1 through 3.3 respectively, and 
on the extended approaches of Veatch et al. (1999), Tzannatos (2003) and API/NPRA (2004). 
Table  3.8: Example of SRI Interpretation 
 
Consequence 
Score Threat Vulnerability Casualties 
No. 
Downtime Exposure Loss % 
67 Attacks are likely to 
be limited by attacker 
expertise, resources, 
or opportunity 
Attacker with moderate 
levels of resource and 
skill could be expected to 
exploit the vulnerabilities 
identified  











valued at  25% 




Among the vital features of the newly developed security risk metric presented here is the SRI 
for the passenger and cabin baggage system, which is one of the most important security systems 
at airport terminals. The SRI with respect to passengers, cabin baggage, and checked-in luggage 
is calculated by assessing the three dimensions of security risk: threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences. As a quantitative measure, the SRI helps airport security officials acquire deep 
risk-based insight into the security status of their airports, to evaluate the level of security 
improvement needed, and to obtain a solid reference for prioritizing the potential upgrades. In 
addition, once a security risk metric have been developed for all airport security systems, the SRI 
will enable airport authorities to make comparisons between components of security subsystems, 
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subsystems, and complete systems at both the single and multiple terminal levels. The developed 
security metric can be extended to multiple systems at a single airport and also to multiple 
airports. As presented in the next chapter, the SRI has also been further utilized in order to 
develop an automated airport security upgrade decision support system. This system enables 
security officials to obtain a better understanding of the different levels of upgrades for each 
security system along with their implications in terms of cost savings, improvements in the 
effectiveness of their security systems, and the overall enhancement of airport performance. 
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CHAPTER 4  
DECISION SUPORT SYSTEM FOR AIRPORT SECURITY UPGRADES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Many policy and decision makers advocate using a risk methodology for security assessment 
(Dillon et al., 2009). In this chapter, a risk-based approach is presented as the basis for the 
development of a decision support framework for upgrading the security measures for airport 
passenger and cabin baggage screening system (PCBSS). The framework uses the security risk 
metric described in Chapter 3 in order to assess the security deficiencies in existing systems at 
international passenger terminals. Based on a detailed database that inventories the probability of 
security measure(s), device(s), and equipment, detecting each threat type, the framework 
optimizes the most cost-effective upgrade strategy. 
4.2 Proposed Framework 
The main components of the proposed framework for upgrading the security systems in airports 
as shown in Figure  4.1, are as follows: 
1. Analysis models that include a new security assessment model based on the security 
metric described in Chapter 3 and an upgrade options model for defining the cost and 
performance of security countermeasures 
2. A decision support module, which is basically a cost-optimization model for prioritizing 
upgrade actions, and considering practical constraints and performance requirements 
In the next sections, each of these components is discussed in more detail relative to a PCBSS. 
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Figure  4.1: The Conceptual Decision Support System Framework 
 
 
4.3 Analysis Models 
4.3.1 Implementing the Security Risk Metric 
The security risk metric is an assessment tool for facilitating data collection with respect to the 
three security risk dimensions of the PCBSS: threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. The 
assessment tool applies the criteria listed in Tables 3.1 through 3.3, and Equations 3.3 through 
3.13. The assessment of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences was implemented using 
MS Excel spreadsheets. The spreadsheet models a hypothetical example of an airport terminal, 
with security checkpoints in the departures and arrivals subsystems (directions) in any airport 
configuration. The spreadsheets implemented and the analysis metric calculations are described 
briefly in the following sections. 
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Threat Assessment Spreadsheet 
The user can select each airport terminal separately and can enter data with respect to the three 
main threat categories along with their types (Figure  4.2). This process is followed for all 
terminals in the departures and arrivals subsystems. The user has the ability to complete the 
assessment using the drop-down menus to choose one of six levels in order to define the level of 
each threat type for both departures and arrivals directions. Then, in real time, the metric 
spreadsheet calculates the threat scores using a central tendency measure (arithmetic mean) to 
produce indices for each threat type (PCBSS subsystem component), category (PCBSS 
subsystem: departures or arrivals), and terminal (PCBSS system). The metric also automatically 
provides a brief description of the overall threat assessment for the terminal under investigation, 
based on criteria listed in Table 3.1, as shown in Figure  4.2. 
 
 

















Explosive category score 
in arrival direction 
Three threat categories Choose an airport terminal 
Overall Threat 
Level =  4.06 / 5  
     = Very  High 
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For the example shown in Figure  4.2, the overall threat risk score is 4.06 out of 5. According to 
the criteria used, the level is classified as very high, which means that “a credible threat exists 
against the airport assets, so that continuous or intensive attacks are likely to occur and that the 
adversary demonstrates the capability and intent to launch an attack targeting the airport or one 
of its assets on a frequently occurring basis, and specialized security advice should be sought.” If 
the score was less than 4, then the threat risk is the high level, which means a relatively lower 
level of threat. 
 
Vulnerability Assessment Spreadsheet 
The vulnerability PCBSS can be assessed based on the reliability of the existing measures in 
detecting potential threats. To facilitate the assessment, the PCBSS is divided into subsystems 
(Departures and Arrivals), which are further split into a number of security checkpoints (SCPs). 
Each SCP incorporates a number of mitigation measures (devices, equipment, and measures) that 
designed to detect, deter, mitigate, or defend against adversary attacks. Therefore, based on from 
security experts inputs with respect to the reliability of detecting detect threat types (the 
effectiveness of the measure in detecting threat types), who rated them on a scale from 0 (N/A) 
to 1 (very high), a comprehensive measures database was built in order to store probabilities, 
technical information, and cost data associated with each measure. A sample of the database is 
shown in Figure  4.3. 
 
The database includes the probabilities of detection associated with most accredited measures in 
terms of equipment, devices, and measures that scan passengers, cabin baggage, and checked-in 
luggage.  The database inventories the measures of mitigation according to the type of the 
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measure, technology used, and usage; the reliability of the measure for detecting different threats 




Figure  4.3:  Sample from the Database of the Reliability and Cost Information   
of the Security Measures 
 
To enable a vulnerability assessment of the ith measure at the jth SCP in the kth subsystem in the 
sth system, the metric presents data in a hierarchical order that allows the user to assess their 
vulnerabilities and consequent vulnerability scores both separately and simultaneously. 
 
 
Accordingly, as shown in Figure  4.4 once the user identifies all i measures at each of j SCPs, the 
vulnerability spreadsheet retrieves their corresponding levels of detection reliability from the 
database and calculates the vulnerability scores for each ith measure with respect to passengers, 
cabin baggage, and checked-in luggage. Based on Equations 3.6 to 3.11, the spread sheet, 
calculates the vulnerability of all th threat types towards all SCPs for all kth subsystems at the 
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PCBSS levels. As the user enters the in-place measures, the metric displays simultaneously the 
corresponding current vulnerability scores for individual or all passenger, cabin baggage, and 
checked-in luggage measures; departure, arrival, and PCBSS levels; and the corresponding SRI 
for these levels. For the example shown in Figure  4.4, the vulnerability score of the PCBSS is 
3.63, which means that the system’s level of vulnerability is between 3 and 4, or, according to 




















Figure  4.4: Vulnerability Assessment Spreadsheet 
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The interpretation of this score is that “a credible threat exists against the airport assets based on 
knowledge of the adversary's capability and intent to attack the airport assets, which involve high 
levels of expertise, resources, and support and based on related incidents having taken place at 
similar airports or in similar situations.” The metric thus provides a comprehensive assessment of 
vulnerability at a terminal’s departures, arrivals, and PCBSS levels. As well, once all other 
airport systems have been assessed, the metric automatically calculates the overall SRI for the 
airport and predicts the most applicable vulnerability status. 
 
Consequence Assessment Spreadsheet 
As shown in Figure  4.5, each threat type under each threat category has consequence associated 
with cases in which an adversary succeeds in exploiting the current vulnerabilities. Therefore, a 
database was developed in order to define the consequences of each level of each threat type in 
terms of the four main categories of consequences: casualties, downtime, exposure, and damage 
value. Once the user determines the level of each type of threat, the Excel functions 
automatically retrieve from the database the corresponding detailed consequences: how many 
casualties would be expected, for how long the terminal will be shut down, what the level of 
public exposure might be, and what percentage of damage to the terminal building is expected. 
The metric then calculates simultaneously encountered consequence scores for every category at 
the departures, arrivals, and terminal levels. For the example shown Figure 4.4, the SRI for the 
PCBSS is 2.58, which means that the system’s level of consequence is below 3, or according to 
Table 3.3, at the medium level. The interpretation of this score is that “fatalities range from 11 - 
25 people; the terminal downtime would be between 16 and 24 hours, potential litigation is to be 















Figure  4.5: Consequence Assessment Spreadsheet 
 
Once all data are input, the metric calculates the SRI based on Equation 3.9. Since the acceptable 
SRI is defined, according to Table 3.7, the SRI score ranges from 0 to 5. In other words, any SRI 
score above 5 will require the application of the countermeasures necessary to mitigate the risk 
and maintain it at an acceptable level, that is, less than or equal to 5. This stage is very important 
since implementing security upgrades, is in fact, a trade-off between benefit/cost and the 
mitigated level of risk. Hence, a defined threshold should always be set up initially before any 
security risk assessment is begun, and before mitigation alternatives and their associated 
benefit/cost ratios are determined and loaded into the background of the framework.  
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Based on Berbash et al. (2008), the aggregated SRI and its hierarchical summation for an ith 
airport can also be used for further analysis and to develop a framework for decision support 
strategies related to cost-effective security upgrades for other security systems at the airport 
level. This concept is explained through a hypothetical summary of the threats, vulnerabilities, 
and consequences for the PCBSS at two airport terminals as shown in Table  4.1. As well, once 
all other airport systems have been assessed and their scores determined, the metric 
automatically calculates a total SRI for the airport, as shown in Figure 3.6. 
Table  4.1: SRI Summary for Terminals 1 and 2 
 
 Terminal 1 Terminal 2 
Threat 4.06 4.65 
Vulnerability 2.41 2.57 
Consequence 3.33 3.78 
Terminal’s Security Risk Index (SRI) 32.54 45.23 
Overall Security Risk Index (SRI) 38.89 
 
4.3.2 Security Upgrade Model 
The framework’s second model (Figure  4.1) is a security upgrade options model. To offer a wide 
range of flexible options, the developed upgrade options model uses all mitigation measures 
stored in the database and their associated reliability and cost data. For the purposed of this 
research, the cost includes only the capital investment plus total operating expenses for one year. 
However, the model is designed to be easily extended to consider multiple years, in two-year or 
three-year slices. In the developed model, the costs are expressed in terms of unit cost of the 
device or measure, based on the nature of the system or the systems component(s) or on the 
percentage of complete substitution of the system required or the replacement of some of its 
main functional components. Using the database inventory of measures, the GA-based 
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optimization model generates and tests different sets and combinations of sets of mitigation 
alternatives, in order to arrive to the most cost-effective upgrade scenario. In extreme cases, 
more or fewer mitigation alternatives can be considered. Table  4.2 illustrates the calculation of 
an example of output from the upgrade options model. The security benefit is defined as the 
mitigation enhancement achieved by each mitigation alternative or combination of alternatives, 
which ranges in value from 0 to 1.00 (i.e., 0 % to 100 %). 
 
Table  4.2: of Enhancement Values for Determining the Effect of Upgrade Decisions 
Existing 
Device/Measure 




Dielectric Portal+1 Guard + 
Desktop Explosive Trace Detectors 
56.1 % 56.1 % – 42 % = 0.14 
 
Based on Table  4.2, it is possible to establish a Security Upgrade Benefit (Bsu), the general form 
is represented as follows: 
                                                  Bsu = SRI after upgrade -  SRI before upgrade              Equation  4.1 
where    Bsu   is the security upgrade benefit for the PCBSS  
Equation  4.1: PCBSS Security Upgrade Benefit (Bsu) 
 
Structure of the Security Upgrade Model 
When studying security upgrade options, decision makers are often faced with many challenges 
and constraints that must be considered in the decision-making process: 
1. Technology-level requirements and the compatibility of upgrades with existing systems 
2. Preferences of airport officials for a desired SRI level  
3. Preset priorities (security level) of some systems, subsystems, or subsystem components 
4. Allowable yearly expenditures  
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The developed security upgrade model is structured to help a decision maker search for the most 
cost-effective upgrade strategy (upgrade type, level of upgrade, priority of upgrade, etc.) among 
the feasible upgrading scenarios (combinations of mitigation alternatives). The model 
incorporates the output from the Security Risk Metric (presented in Chapter 3) as well as the 
upgrade options. 
An additional consideration is the fact that in practice, vulnerability is the most controllable risk 
dimension. Thus, once a terminal’s baseline SRI is determined, the security upgrade model, 
which is based on the specific security needs and constraints set by the security officials, enables 
decision makers to execute detailed “what-if” analysis scenarios, and to justify scenarios that 
have an SRI less than or equal to the acceptable level and that satisfy all needs and constraints.  
The advantage of the framework is that its security upgrade model uses the SRIs produced by the 
security metric; thus, different subsystem components, subsystems, systems, and airport 
terminals can be compared and prioritized according to specific criteria. Therefore, when 
adjusting any vulnerability level, meaning changing the type of one or more screening devices, 
piece of equipment, or measures, as a result, mitigation alternatives are then revised and a 
corresponding cost-effective upgrade plan is calculated accordingly.  
For practicality and simplicity, the framework was modeled in a MS Excel spreadsheet using 
hypothetical data (though the model was partially validated through the used of data supplied by 
the management of an international airport, as presented in the next chapter).  
Figure  4.6 shows a screen shot of the model’s MS Excel spreadsheet for the PCBSS. SCPs in 
both directions (departures and arrivals) are on the far left in column C; column D lists all the 
security checkpoints in both subsystems; column G indicates the type of existing 
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countermeasures, whose index numbers are shown in column I; columns H and M indicate the 
suggested upgrade mitigation measure and their index numbers; the reliability of existing 
measures is shown in column J; the indexes for the upgrade options (decision variables) are 












Figure  4.6: Model Formulation (Terminal 1 PCBSS) 
The top part of the spreadsheet also shows the overall upgrade vulnerability score; overall 
security risk indices (before and after); detailed security risk indices for passengers, cabin 
baggage, and checked-in luggage; the budget limit; total upgrade costs; the upgrade benefit; and 
the total benefit-cost ratio. 
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4.4 Decision Optimization 
To examine the functionality of the framework, the module was initially run using hypothetical 
data at the PCBSS level, including screening checkpoints in both directions (departure and 
arrival), as well as the cost of each upgrade decision option, as shown in the example presented 
in Figure  4.3. To validate the developed framework theoretically, the decision support module 
was tested with three different methods of solving the upgrade problem in order to search for the 
optimum cost-effective upgrading strategy. The three methods were a simple ranking method, 
such as manual priority ranking; a mathematical optimization technique, such as the linear 
technique; and a non-traditional optimization technique, such as genetic algorithms (GAs). The 
optimum strategy identifies two main types of output: the specific type of upgrade decision and 
the associated cost of the upgrades. 
 
4.4.1 Priority-Based Ranking Method  
The priority-based ranking method uses the new security risk metric database (i.e., the reliability 
indexes), to calculate an upgrade decision priority index, indicated in column P in Figure 4.7, for 
each security measure at all SCPs and subsystem levels. The priority index for a security 
measure PIi is determined by calculating the difference between 5 and its initial reliability index 
(Ri), as follows: 
                                                 5iPI initial iR                                : Equation  4.2r 
Equation  4.2: Security Upgrade Priority Index 
The assumed criterion is that the ith measure at the jth SCP that has the highest priority index 
should be upgraded first, followed by the others in descending order, and so on. Therefore, the 
first step is the calculation of the priority index for every ith measure at the jth SCP for both the 
departure and arrival subsystems and the second step is to sort all PIs and rank them in 





























Figure  4.7: Security Checkpoints Ordered According to Priority 
 
The lowest priority index shown in Figure 4.7, is 2.28. Since the upgrade plan is for one year 
only, the subsystem components that have a PI=5 will be upgraded with the mitigation measures 
that have the highest score, and then those with a PI< 5 will be upgraded as long as the allowable 
upgrade budget limitations are met. When budget constraints are about to exceeded the 
limitations, and some eligible measures remain to be upgraded, those measures will be upgraded. 
As can be seen in the example shown in Figure 4.8, the total allowable upgrade budget is 
$35,000,000 and the initial SRI = 26.50. The results of applying the priority index (PI) approach 
are as follows: the SRI achieved was 7.46, which reflects a significant improvement in the 
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security level; however, the approach did not succeed in upgrading all measures. Due to budget 





Figure  4.8: MS Excel Spread-Sheet of Priority index-based Solution 
 
To examine the optimality of any upgrade decision, the benefit-cost ratio (B/C) for the priority-
index-based solution is calculated, as follows: 
         
710/  suss
B
CB  Equation  4.4 
where  Bsu(s)     is the benefit/cost ratio for PCBSS upgrades 
           CPCB(st)  is the cost of upgrading the PCBSS  
Equation  4.3: Benefit/Cost Ratio for Upgrading the PCBSS 
 
 Due to the budget constraints, the benefit-cost ratio (B/C) for the priority-index-based solution 
was found to be 4.95. Therefore, it is clear that this method does not provide an optimum 
Ranked PIs Measures not upgraded 
CPCB(s) 
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solution because 12 measures are left not upgraded, the SRI score achieved is higher 5, and the 
B/C ratio is low. 
 
4.4.2 Mathematical Optimization 
Since the priority-index-based solution does not arrive at an optimum upgrade plan and does not 
take into consideration all constraints, the model was run using the Solver software, an MS Excel 
add-in tool based on mathematical linear optimization techniques, in order to search for the 
optimum plan. The first step was to formulate the optimization objective function. In this case, 
the optimization objective function is set to maximize the PCBSS’s benefit/cost ratio (Bsu(s)) over 
the planning horizon (one year), as expressed in Equation  4.4. The second step is to determine 
the optimization variables and to set the constraints. Decision variables were classified into a 
one-year level that deals with the 26 SCPs. Therefore, the objective function can be expressed 
mathematically as follows: 









10/  Equation  4.4 
 
where  Bsu(s)     is the benefit/cost ratio for PCBSS upgrades at one year (t) 
            T          is number of planning horizon years, and  
           CPCB(st)  is the cost of upgrading the PCBSS at year (t) 
Equation  4.4: Optimization Objective Function (Max. B/C) 
 
It should be noted that the benefits are not quantified in dollars. However, the B/C ratio is not 
just a unitless value, rather the B/C used in this research, is in fact, a value that represents the 
amount of risk reduction per dollar, which is a maximized return on investment. This objective 
function is also compared later with other objective function, such as the minimization of the 
CPCB(st) 
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overall SRI. Generally, the optimization objective function is subject to the following 
constraints: 
1. The total annual upgrade costs ( tC ) in a given year should be less than or equal to the 
maximum budget limit in that year (Bt) and can be expressed as follows: 





                                     Equation  4.5 
Equation  4.5: Optimization Upgrade Budget Constraint 
 
The overall security risk index achieved for passengers (SRIP) should be greater than or equal to 
the minimum acceptable level and also less than or equal to the maximum level, which can be 
expressed as follows: 
                                acceptable level  Pp SRI  min level p        Equation  4.6  
Equation  4.6: Acceptable Passenger SRI at Subsystem Component Level 
 
The overall security risk index achieved for cabin baggage (SRIB) should be greater than or equal 
to the minimum acceptable level and also less than or equal to the maximum level, which can be 
expressed as follows: 
                                 acceptable level  Bb SRI  min level   b      Equation  4.7 
Equation  4.7: Acceptable Cabin Baggage SRI at Subsystem Component Level 
 
The overall security risk index achieved for checked-in luggage (SRIL) should be greater than or 
equal to the minimum acceptable level and also less than or equal to the maximum level, which 
can be expressed as follows: 
                                 acceptable level  Ll SRI  min level   l      Equation  4.8 
Equation  4.8: Acceptable Checked-in Luggage SRI at Subsystem Component Level 
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The security risk index achieved for any security subsystem ( kSRI ) should be greater than or 
equal to the minimum acceptable level, and it should be less than or equal to the maximum level, 
which can be expressed as follows: 
 
                                acceptable level  kk SRI  min level k          Equation  4.9 
Equation  4.9: Minimum Acceptable SRI at Subsystem Level 
 
The security risk index achieved for any security system ( sSKI ) should be greater than or equal 
to the minimum acceptable level, and it should be less than or equal to the maximum level, 
which can be expressed as follows: 
                                   acceptable level  ss SRI  min level s         Equation  4.10 
Equation  4.10: Minimum Acceptable SRI at System Level 
 
The overall airport security index achieved ( aSRI ) should be greater than or equal to the 
minimum acceptable level, and it should be less than or equal to the maximum level, which can 
be expressed as follows: 
                                        acceptable level  aSRI  min level              Equation  4.11 
Equation  4.11: Minimum Acceptable SRI at Airport Level 
 
The third step was to determine the expected solution space. According to Nunoo and  Mrawira 
(2004), the solution space is expected to be huge. The number of potential solutions can be 
denoted as R NT, where R is the number of suggested upgrade alternatives for each mitigation 
measure at each screening checkpoint, N is the total number of similar security checkpoints, and 
T is the number of years in the objective planning span. In this context, at a typical PCBSS level, 
the assigned values for R vary from one screening checkpoint (subsystem) to another and from 
one screening target measure (subsystem component) to another. For example, according to the 
reliability database (Figure  4.3), there are 37 (R=37) upgrade options (alternative mitigation 
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measures) for ray and physical search screening measures in each subsystem (departure and 
arrival directions), there are 4 SCPs that use ray and physical search screening measures (N=4), 
and the planning horizon is set to be one year (T=1). According to Nunoo and Mrawira (2004), 
the number of potential mitigation combinations is then RNT, where R is the number of upgrade 
options for each mitigation measure, N is the total number of SCPs in the concerned subsystem, 
and T is the number of years in the objective planning span. Therefore, for example, the number 
of possible combinations of solutions specifically for ray and physical search in a subsystem 
equals 3741. Once the planning horizon is increased to more than one year (N>1), the solution 
space increases exponentially for this single subsystem component. Likewise, the total solution 
space for the whole system will be extremely large since it will include the accumulative 
summation of all combinations of single subsystem components. 
 
The next step was to feed the optimization model with the objective function and to set the 
associated constraints. Solver was then run, but due to the large number of feasible solutions, 
Solver could not deal with this optimization problem. Solver showed a failure message, as 
illustrated in Figure  4.9. 
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4.4.3 The Non-Traditional Optimization Technique 
Since Solver failed, a non-traditional algorithm-based optimization technique was used. Based 
on the Flintsch and Chen (2004) comprehensive review of various soft computing techniques, the 
genetic algorithms (GAs) technique was selected. The developed optimization model uses the 
GAs mechanism to investigate feasible upgrading scenarios (combinations of mitigation 
alternatives) in order to optimize the upgrade strategy (upgrade type, level of upgrade, priority of 
upgrade, etc.). The optimization model Figure 4.10 incorporates the output from the Security 















Figure  4.10: The Conceptual Optimization Model 
 
 
The model utilizes the ability of GAs to deal with large solution spaces, to arrive at a solution 
that is close to the optimum solution, and not to become stuck at local minima (Goldberg, 1989). 
As Holland (1975) explained, the process of implementing the GAs technique can be 
summarized in the steps illustrated in Figure 4.11. The approach is based on a chromosome 
designed as a string of N  T, where N is the total number of unique combinations of mitigation 
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measures per subsystem in the PCBSS at the single-airport terminal level (26 in this case, 
distributed in 5 SCPs in departures and 5 SCPs in arrivals), and T is the number of years in the 
planning horizon (one in this case). The values of the string bits are correlated with optimization 
variables to make up the chromosome structure (Holland, 1975).  Each chromosome element 
(gene) holds a value from 1 to 4, 5, 6, or 37, depending on the type of SCP measure, and 
corresponds to one of the upgrade options (one means do nothing). The general chromosome 
















Figure  4.12: The GA Chromosome Structure 
T = Planning Horizon = 1 
N = Number of mitigation measures
1 3 2 1 37 2 6 5 1 24 
1     2     3   …    T                                                                   N  
T = 1 
Mitigation measure no. 1 
T = 1
Mitigation measure no. N  
Upgrade Decision Option 
 
(1 = Do Nothing) 
N  T
Randomly generate an initial population    
(chromosome strings)
Define selection probabilities to determine the 
robustness of each chromosome
Iterate by generating a new population to produce 
offspring via genetic operators
Crossover/Mutation
Encode solutions of the problem 
(Optimization parameters)
Choose the successful genomes based on those best 














































Moreover, the optimization model, which is based on input from security officials, executes 
detailed “what-if” analysis scenarios in order to justify scenarios that have an SRI less than or 
equal to the acceptable level and that satisfy the other needs and constraints. To this end, the 
optimization model initiates an SRI re-assessment process through the GAs mechanism (Figure 
4.13) for determining the near optimum upgrade scenario and suggesting the best cost-effective 
measures that will produce the lowest possible SRI and the best benefit/cost ratio. Individual 
scenarios that present significant vulnerability along with critical threats or consequences are 
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As shown in Figure  4.6, airport officials center specific data and can thus manually force the 
system to meet a specific security index (cell H7), targeted security scores (column 0), the total 
planning horizon budget (cell G8), and the allowable budget (cell H8). The Gas, based on the 
type and the cost of the measures retrieved from the database (Figure  4.3), run different random 
upgrade scenarios. Once the global optimum scenario is found, the system displays the suggested 
upgrade decision options in column M, and their associated upgrade expenditures in column Q. 
In addition, airport officials can pre-define some of the upgrade decisions (column M) and can 
tweak them manually to suit their airport’s special needs or other policy issues. To ensure that an 
upgrade decision is considered up to a specific limit, an upper limit is introduced (column N) that 
forces the model to consider the specified limits at the same time. Once the user enters all the 
desired input data, he can then proceed by running Evolver-GA-based software. When Evolver 

















1. Define the objective function cell, and choose from three optimization options: minimize, 
maximize, or find value closest to a specific target value. In this case, it would be B/C 
cell (Equation  4.4), and the optimization option, which is maximization.  
2. Set adjusting cells (optimization objective function variables), which in this case, would 
be the upgrade decision cells in column N. 
3. Select optimization constraint cells as defined in Equations 4.5 through 4.10. 
 
The next step is to determine the population size, generation of the random number seed 
(randomly or fixed), and the stop criteria. This can be performed using the options, as shown in 
Figure  4.15. Other available options include general options, such as pause on error and graph 
progress, and options for updating the display, such as every calculation, with only the best 
result, and never.  
 
Figure  4.15: Options for Evolver Settings 
 
The stopping criteria include the following options: stop at a specific number of trials, after a 
specified number of minutes after the beginning of the run, when the change after a specified 
Population 
size N





after n trials and/or 
n minutes 
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number of trials is less than a specified percentage, or when a pre-defined formula becomes true. 
Once Evolver’s settings are properly entered as desired, the GA evolutionary process runs until it 
arrives at the best solution near the global optima, which will be equivalent to the optimum 
upgrade strategy that satisfies all constraints as well as the Evolver settings. As illustrated in 
Figure 4.16, the GA-based model for maximizing the B/C ratio was able to achieve better results 
than the priority index-based model. It should also be noted that the passenger risks score 

























As the GAs model is run for the second time based on minimizing the overall SRI, a summary is 
produced that compare the results of all experiments, as shown in Table  4.3. The summary 
proves that the results of the Gas-based solution for minimizing the SRI are very encouraging 
and that the use of a GA approach is a promising technique for determining the near optimum 
upgrade strategy. 














Total   
Budget 
Expenditures 
Priority Index 22.26 0.05 0.08 7.46 4.95 $34,716,000
Optimization (max. B/C) 2.58 0.32 1.25 1.39 6.86 $33,938,240
Optimization (min. SRI) 2.42 0.32 1.26 1.33 6.68 $34,940,440
 
As shown in Figure  4.17, the minimum SRI-based GA solution would slightly improve the 
maximizing B/C ratio results. Table  4.3 shows the summary of the three experiments and also 
shows that the System’s SRI would be decreased from 17.73 to 1.26. In terms of the total actual 
upgrade expenditures and the maximum utilization of the original total planning horizon budget, 
the minimum SRI-based GA-based solution achieved high level of utilization at 99.77%. With 
respect to the upgrades risks and the B/C ratio, the GA-based solution realized the lowest level of 
risks 1.33 and the highest B/C ratio (6.86). 
4.5 Discussion of Results 
The results shown in Table  4.3 suggest that decisions related to PCBSS upgrades can be 
optimized using the developed security metric and optimization model. The following 
observations can be made: 







Figure  4.17: Optimization Solution for minimizing SRI with Risk reduced to 1.33 
 
2. Of the three methods tested, GA decisions are capable of producing the best upgrade 
solution, in this case, a minimum SRI of 1.89. The GA decisions also achieved a better 
B/C ratio and vulnerability levels. 
3. The performance of the GAs and their ability to allocate upgrade funds efficiently are 
promising, especially when the objective function is geared toward minimizing the 
overall SRI. The solution also achieved the maximum reduction in the risks associated 



















4.6 Summary and Conclusion 
To respond to the need for airport security officials to have a decision support tool to help them 
upgrade their airports’ security systems cost-effectively, a risk-based optimization framework 
has been developed successfully.  The framework highlights some of the main upgrade 
constraints with respect to budget and the level and type of mitigation measures, and illustrates 
methods of integrating them with other factors. The application of an optimization approach 
based on the utilization of artificial intelligence techniques (e.g., GAs) will help airport 
authorities in their crucial mission to investigate multiple “what-if” scenarios and to make 
decisions that optimize and prioritize the costs of upgrades to their PCBSS. Initially, setting the 
optimization model based on maximizing the benefit/cost ratio as the target objective function, 
which already incorporates the upgraded SRI, produced promising results. However, switching 
the objective function to minimize the overall SRI produced results that are more encouraging. 
Therefore, the latter approach was adopted during the validation process. Chapter 5 presents a 
real-life case study at an international airport in order to validate the model. An approach based 
on expert opinion was also implemented through consultations and research meetings with 
subject experts from the Greater Toronto Airport Authority and the Libyan Civil Aviation 
Authority as part of the process of validating the optimization framework. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Validation of the Airport Security Upgrade Framework  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents two approaches to validating the proposed framework components. The 
first was to acquire experts at the Greater Toronto Airport Authority (GTAA) their overall 
evaluation and expectations. The second was to conduct a case study at one of the Libyan Civil 
Aviation Authority’s (LYCAA) international airports. The security risk metric and the 
optimization model were used in modeling and presenting the case study at the passenger and 
cabin baggage screening system (PCBSS) level. Furthermore, the actual decision made by the 
LYCAA and those suggested by the developed framework were compared with respect to 
expected benefits, the SRI, total upgrade expenditures, and the benefit-cost ratio. A sensitivity 
analysis was conducted and the confidence interval was also investigated. 
 
5.2 GTAA Feedback 
Over the course of a year, research meetings, interviews, and conference calls were held with 
GTAA airport security personnel at the advisory and managerial levels. The research meetings, 
interviews, and conference calls were very useful in the development of the new metric and the 
prototype of the development framework, particularly with respect to the following points: 
1. Verifying the definition and categorization of the types and levels of threats, and their 
potential consequences that actually confront airport security, 
2. Consistent list format providing a positive evaluation of the suggested vulnerability 
assessment approach based on checkpoint configuration and the reliability of screening 
measures, and 
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3. Confirming the metric’s quantitative assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences at different levels; the output of the optimization model; and the use of 
genetic algorithms in arriving at an optimum upgrade plan. 
During the research meetings, interviews, and a live demonstration of the prototype system 
GTAA personnel stated that they were interested in the developed framework. They indicated 
that the framework is beneficial and that the optimization feature is innovative and non-existent 
in other systems they are aware of. They also suggested that it will be more powerful when 
extended to include other security systems, and will help decision makers in their efforts to 
optimize all aspects of upgrades to airport security.  GTAA personnel commented positively 
about the practicality of the security metric and the optimization model. In addition, they valued 
the ability of the framework to maximize the return on investment in security upgrades. After the 
demonstration, GTAA security officials indicated their willingness to provide real data for 
testing the framework and extending it to meet GTAA needs. However, due to confidentiality 
issue and the sensitive nature of security data, the GTAA was not able to provide the data 
required. 
5.3 Libyan Case Study 
The developed framework was used with data collected from the Libyan Civil Aviation 
Authority (LYCAA). Currently, the LYCAA does not have a risk metric or an optimization 
model for security system upgrades. The LYCAA is a state agency that owns and operates three 
international and ten domestic airports. The LYCAA officials were helpful and cooperative in 
providing the security data from an international airport necessary for validating the developed 
optimization framework, which for confidentiality reasons has been kept undeclared. Related 
data and information were also collected through interviews and meetings, field visits, and some 
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LYCAA documentation. The interviews included meetings with the Chairman of LYCAA, some 
of the passenger and cabin baggage screening engineers, airport security officials, and a number 
of other LYCAA officials. The data collected include: in place screening measures; 
configuration of current security checkpoints, the reliability of existing measures, available 
upgrade options and their cost, and the budget available for upgrades.  
5.3.1 Security Assessment of Existing Measures 
The security risk status of the designated international airport was assessed in terms of the 
current threat levels, vulnerabilities, and expected consequences. Figures 5.1 to 5.4 show the 
current status of the airport security assessment.  
 
Threat Assessment 
According to the threat assessment shown in Figure  5.1, the threat was assessed at a very high 
level (score = 4.44/5), which, according to the description in Table  3.1, means “Identifies that a 
credible threat exists against the airport assets, so that continuous or intensive attacks are likely 
to occur, and that the adversary demonstrates the capability and intent to launch an attack 
targeting the airport or one of its assets on a frequently occurring basis, and that specialized 
security advice should be sought.” 
 
 
Figure  5.1: LYCAA Airport’s Threats Assessment 
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Vulnerability Assessment  
To evaluate the vulnerability assessment, the existing security screening measures at the LYCAA 
airport terminal were entered into the prototype, as shown in Figure 5.2. Accordingly, the 
vulnerability assessment towards threats (Figure  5.3) is assessed as high level (score= 3.54/5), 
which based on the description in Table  3.2, means “there are some protective measures to deter, 
detect, delay, or respond to the asset, but not a complete or effective application of these security 
strategies and so it would be relatively easy for the adversary to successfully attack the airport 
asset, and a limited opportunity and a little specialized knowledge would be needed”. Figure  5.3 
shows the detailed vulnerability calculated towards each threat type and the aggregated 
vulnerabilities for passengers, cabin baggage, and checked-in luggage, calculated for both the 























Figure  5.2: Existing Security Screening Measures 
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Figure  5.3: Vulnerability of Existing Measures 
 
Consequence Assessment 
The assessment of the consequences was determined to be High (score = 3.67/5) as shown in 
Figure  5.4. Based on the description in Table  3.3, this means “25 - 50 Fatalities, 24 - 48 Hours 
town time, Congressional Mandates, and 50% - 75% total loss.”  
 




























Upon evaluating the threats, the vulnerability, and the consequences, the security risk indexes for 
passengers, cabin baggage, and luggage were calculated for each terminal subsystem (departure 
and arrival) and for the overall terminal, as shown in Figure  5.5. Based on the calculations in 
Figure  5.5, the overall Security Risk Index was 33.06; therefore, the PCBSS need to be upgraded 
in order to achieve an acceptable SRI (0 – 5).   
 
Figure  5.5: Security Risk Indexes for Existing Measures 
 
5.3.2 Upgrade Options and Cost Data 
The budget and cost data were based on the information collected during interviews and 
meetings with LYCAA and security professionals at the designated International Airport. Most 
of the cost data were based on unit prices for the screening equipment, obtained from LYCAA 
upgrade contracts. Other cost data were obtained from current offers submitted to the LYCAA 
for consideration.  For simplicity, some combinations of two or more mitigation measures were 
used to facilitate smooth upgrade decision choices. The cost data gathered (for single and 
combinations of measures) were grouped into five main categories: ray and passenger physical 
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search, two types of X-ray scanners, background checks, trace detection, and physical screening. 
Under each category, a number of principal mitigation measures were identified as shown in 
Table  5.1. 
Table  5.1: Cost Estimate for Upgrade Options 
 
Category Measure / Device Qyt. 
Ray and passenger physical search Security guard (Operator) 20-36 
 Metal detector gate (PMD2 / PTZ) 20-36 
 Entry scan gat 20-36 
 Millimeter wave gate 20-36 
 Dielectric portal gate 20-36 
 Handheld metal detectors 16-26 
 Handheld explosive trace detectors 20-36 
 Desktop explosive trace detectors 20-36 
 Physical search guard 8-16 
 Sniffing dog 2-8 
 Biological agent detector 2-8 
X-ray scanners Conventional X-Ray (COB) 20-36 
 Explosive X-ray (COB) 20-36 
 EDS System-single view (OHB) 20-36 
 EDS System doul view (OHB) 20-36 
 EDS System multi-view (OHB) 20-36 
Rotating X-ray scanners CTX 2500 (OHB) 2-8 
 CTX 5500 DS (OHB) 2-8 
 CTX 9000 (OHB) 2-8 
Background check Criminal Check 1-2 
 Biometric cameras and Fingerprints 20-36 
Trace detection Chemiluminescence 8-16 
 Ion mobility spectrometry (Ionscan) 8-16 
 Ion track itemizer 8-16 
Physical scanners Luggage hand search 8-16 
 Luggage-sniffing dogs 2-8 
 
The total allowable upgrade budget was determined to be $40,000,000. This budget was intended 
to cover all suggested upgrading measures (equipment and guards) for a one-year plan. For 
confidentiality reasons, unit prices have been omitted, actual quantities have been provided a 
range, and the total costs have been adjusted by an agreed-upon factor with respect to one of the 
designated items. 
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5.3.3 Comparison of Decision Approaches  
According to LYCAA’s international airport security professionals, the PCBSS is re-assessed 
and upgraded every two to three years. Currently, to comply with the latest ICAO security audit, 
the PCBSS should be immediately upgraded to the minimum acceptable risk level (0-5). The 
current LYCAA upgrading process is similar to the simple ranking approach presented in 
Chapter 4, with a small difference: the security checkpoints are sorted manually according to 
their subjective importance and reliability, not according to their risk index. Decisions are then 
made to allocate upgrades to the top-ranked items. Thus, using the developed framework, it is 
possible to simulate the decisions made by the LYCAA officials and to compare them with the 
decisions determined by the optimization framework.  The main objective of the developed 
optimization framework is to reduce the overall security risk index to within an acceptable level 
(0 – 5). The comparison of the LYCAA simple ranking approach and the proposed optimization 
model was based on the following results: 
- Vulnerability scores (passengers, cabin baggage, and checked-in luggage) 
- The overall SRI 
- The security upgrade benefit 
- The benefit-cost ratio 
 
Case 1 - LYCAA Decisions Using Simple Ranking for Maximum Upgrades 
 According to the practice of LYCAA official, the security checkpoints were prioritized 
according to their importance, as illustrated in Table 5.2 and this priority ranking approach 
governs the upgrade decisions. Figure 5.5 shows an MS Excel spreadsheet that models the in-
place and upgrade mitigation measures at LYCAA’s international airport.  Part A shows the 
existing mitigation types or combination of types. Part B shows the suggested upgrade options. 
Part C presents LYCAA’s priority ranking of all SCPs. Part D show the associated upgrade cost. 
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The SCP that has the top priority is upgraded first to the maximum level, and then the next one 
that has the second priority will be upgraded to the second to the highest level, and so on. 
 
Table  5.2: Simple Ranking Index for Checkpoints 
 
Subsystem Security Checkpoint 
Priority 
(1 = Highest – 10 = Lowest) 
Departure Curb-side / Pre-Check-in 1 
 Airline check-in screening 2 
 Out bound luggage screening 3 
 Passenger central gate screening 5 
 Gate screening 8 
Arrival Gate screening 4 
 Passport control 6 
 Inbound luggage screening 7 
 Transit luggage screening 9 
 Transferred luggage screening 10 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.6, following the LYCAA strategy for spending the available budget 
resulted in an inability to upgrade a number of security checkpoints. As expected, the new 
overall SRI (6.15), is still higher than the acceptable limit (0-5), and the overall passenger 
vulnerability is extremely high (17.11) compared to 1.23 and 0.11 for cabin baggage and 
checked-in luggage, respectively. Therefore, it is clear that the simple ranking strategy does not 
fully meet the upgrade objectives, and the following observations can be made about the 
LYCAA approach: 
1- LYCAA’s decision using simple ranking for maximizing upgrades is not efficacious. 
2- Close attention should be paid to the mitigation measures at security checkpoints that 
require large expenditures, in order to determine whether or not to upgrade them to their 
highest level or to the acceptable level of reliability. 
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3- Upgrading some security checkpoints to their highest level does not guarantee the 





Figure  5.6: Case 1 - Simple Ranking Decisions for Maximizing Upgrades 
 
Case 2- LYCAA Decisions Using Simple Ranking Under Reliability Constraints 
Another manual approach is used in which each security measure is upgraded not to the 
maximum (as in case 1) but to an acceptable level of equipment reliability, in order to save costs. 
The acceptable reliability level is assumed to be 4.25. With this approach, the same LYCAA 

















level. Figure  5.7 presents the results of the modified LYCAA strategy. Although some measures 
have been left without upgrades, this approach achieved better results than the approach in case 
1. The overall SRI has been substantially reduced, to 2.25, compared with the SRI produce with 
the original LYCAA strategy (6.15). In addition, the passenger risk has also been substantially 





Figure  5.7: Case 2 - Simple Ranking Decisions under a Reliability Constraint of 4.25 
 
Case 3 - Simple Ranking Based on the Risk Index 
This approach is based on the risk index for each security measure rather than on a subjective 
priority as in cases 1and 2. The priority indexes for different measures were calculated 
accordingly to Equation 4.9, sorted in descending order, and the top-ranked one was upgraded to 




Measures not upgraded 
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an acceptable reliability level (4.25),  until the budget is entirely utilized. Figure 5.8 presents the 
results of this approach. The risk indexes of all security measures are highlighted. The overall 
SRI is 2.497, which is slightly higher than in case 2. However, this approach improved the 
benefit-cost ratio to 8.021, which is slightly better than in case 1 or 2, and the upgrade cost is 
almost 1.77 million less than in case 2. It is possible, therefore, to conclude that this solution 














Figure  5.8: Case 3 - Simple Ranking Decisions Based on the Risk Index 
 
Case 4 – GA-Based Optimization Decisions 
Another approach is to upgrade the existing measures using the optimization feature of the used 
framework with two objective functions: maximize the benefit-cost ratio and minimize the 
Security Risk Index After Upgrading Benefit/Cost After Upgrading








security risk index (case 4, as illustrated in Figure  5.9). The goal is to compare decisions 
produced by used the framework with previous decisions for the same reliability constraint 
(4.25). It should be noted that both objective functions arrive at exactly the same upgrade results. 
Thus, it is clearly shown that the overall B/C and SRI have improved more than in the previous 
three cases. The GA optimization solutions have achieved an overall B/C ratio of 8.053 and have 
reduced the overall risk to 1.428. A summary of the upgrade decisions in the various cases is 
shown in Table  5.3 and in Figures 5.6 to 5.12. The overall security risk index has decreased, 







Figure  5.9: Case 4 - GA-Based Optimization Decisions
Security Risk Index After Upgrading Benefit/Cost After Upgrading








As a result, compared to the other approaches, the optimization model using the GA technique 
was able to achieve the best results, considering the same budget limit, and to utilize the 
available budget to the maximum. The security systems in the designated LYCAA airport can 
therefore be upgraded to the acceptable reliability level (4.25) with a total upgrade expenditure 
of $39,294,000. 
 
Table  5.3: Comparison of the Decision Approaches 
 
Detailed Risks 




Passenger Baggage Luggage 
Case 1- Simple ranking for maximum upgrades 39,084,000 6.15 6.89 17.11 0.11 1.23 
Case 2- Simple ranking under reliability constraints 39,879,000 2.25 7.73 5.720 0.750 0.270 
Case 3- Simple ranking based on risk index 38,107,000 2.497 8.021 4.923 2.306 0.265 
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Figure  5.12: Comparison of the Upgrade Benefits 
 
5.3.4 Additional Experiments 
Once the performance of the optimization model was validated, the following additional 
experiments were carried out to provide security decision makers with meaningful analysis for 
them to use as part of the decision support: 






2- The upgrade budget level that achieves the minimum SRI was determined. 
3- A detailed sensitivity analysis was conducted with respect to the upgrade decisions and 
the level of confidence in the decision made. 
 
Effect of various upgrade budgets 
For the testing of the effect of upgrade budgets, the optimization was run under different budget 
limits ranging from $10M to $35M. All previous constraints remained the same. The objective 
function in the first run was thus set to minimize the overall security risk index, and in the 
second run, it was set to maximize the B/C ratio.  The results of all runs are shown in Tables 5.4 
and 5.5, and in Figures 5.13 to 5.15. 
 












B/C Passenger Baggage Luggage 
1 $10 9.914 2.389 30.941 4.107 2.314 0.747 
2 $20 19.758 2.011 15.717 2.981 2.306 0.747 
3 $30 28.427 1.589 11.072 2.885 1.135 0.747 
4 $35 34.834 1.586 9.037 2.887 1.134 0.747 
 












SRI Passenger Baggage Luggage 
1 $10 9.691 20.802 13.606 37.756 2.314 0.747 
2 $20 19.542 11.376 10.846 29.716 2.307 0.515 
3 $30 29.790 10.566 1.589 2.885 1.134 0.747 




Figure  5.13: Effect of Different Budget Limits on Minimizing the SRI 
 
 
Figure  5.14: Effect of Different Budget Limits on Maximizing the B/C Ratio 
 
 
As shown in Figures 5.13 and 5.14, the effect of different upgrade budgets is to produce different 
results in terms of minimum SRI and maximum B/C for each budget limit. It can also be noted 
that optimizing the upgrades based on minimizing the overall SRI produces better results. 
Furthermore, both objective functions arrive at the same minimum SRI (1.59) for $30 million 
budget limit and a very close maximum B/C ration (10.97 and 11.07) at that budget limit. The 
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Upgrade Budget That Achieves the Minimum SRI 
As shown in Equation 3.13, for this test, the objective function was set to minimize the overall 
SRI with no constraints on budget and considering the same reliability constraint used in the 
previous test. It was assumed that the model is capable of achieving the lowest SRI score. As 
shown in Figure  5.15, the budget associated with the minimum SRI achieved is $87,250,000, and 
the minimum SRI achieved is 1.047. 
 
 
Figure  5.15: GA Optimization Upgrade Budget That Achieves the Minimum SRI 
 
Detailed Sensitivity Analysis 
Another experiment conducted was a detailed sensitivity analysis to test the level of confidence 
in the results produced by the framework. In this experiment, the sensitivity analysis was based 








on running the optimization model under ten different threat levels that varied by  20% from the 
initial threat level. The original constraints and budget limit of $40M remained the same. The 
objective with this scenario was to minimize the overall SRI. As a result, the ten optimization 
experiments were run using ten randomly selected threat levels that were about  20% of the 
original threat level (4.44), ranging from 4.46 to 4.22. The resulting SRI levels range from 1.255 
to 1.474. The results of the ten runs are shown in Table 5.6. As shown in Table 5.6 and Figures 
5.16 to 5.18, as the threat level changes within a  20% range, the SRI changes accordingly. It 
can be noted that even if the overall threat score is the same, different threat combinations 
produce different upgrade decisions. In the various scenarios, the standard deviation of the threat 
levels is 0.083, and the mean threat level is 4.3275. As a result, the average of the optimization 
results is an SRI of 4.431 (STDV = 0.122). The small standard deviation indicates confidence 
that even with a  20% change in the threat levels, the upgrades will achieve a low SRI of 1.431, 
which is falls within the acceptable risk level (0-5). 
 









Vulnerability Passenger Baggage Luggage 
Upgrade 
Budget 
1 4.33 1.47 8.04 1.27 3.00 1.11 0.32 $39,688,000 
2 4.26 1.40 7.16 1.30 2.68 1.04 0.47 $39,550,000 
3 4.46 1.53 7.97 1.30 2.92 1.13 0.52 $39,754,000 
4 4.22 1.64 6.74 1.40 2.51 1.98 0.43 $39,962,000 
5 4.42 1.44 8.25 1.26 2.89 1.15 0.27 $39,901,000 
6 4.26 1.30 7.28 1.24 2.69 1.05 0.17 $39,783,000 
7 4.36 1.42 6.86 1.32 2.59 1.00 0.66 $39,480,000 
8 4.31 1.26 6.79 1.25 2.66 0.95 0.15 $39,714,000 
9 4.35 1.26 6.75 1.24 2.59 0.93 0.27 $39,616,000 
10 4.38 1.41 7.98 1.26 2.89 1.09 0.26 $39,720,000 
μ 4.33 1.43 7.39 1.30 2.74 1.18 0.37  
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Figure  5.18: Sensitivity Comparison of Detailed Risk Levels 
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To test the degree of confidence in these results, the confidence principle was used to return a 
value that can be used to construct a confidence interval for the means of the ten optimization 
runs. Since the confidence interval is a range of values, is defined as the mean (x)  confidence. 
For any population (number of different threat levels) mean μ0 in this range, the probability of 
obtaining a sample mean further from μ0 than x is greater than alpha; for any population mean μ0 
not in this range, the probability of obtaining a sample mean further from μ0 than x is less than 
alpha. 
 
Based on Table 5.6, the data mean of all SRIs (1.431), the standard deviation (0.12), and the size 
(8) were used to construct a two-tailed test at significance level alpha (5%) of the hypothesis that 
the population mean is μ0. The hypothesis is then not rejected if μ0 is in the confidence interval, 
and it is rejected if μ0 is not in the confidence interval. The confidence interval does not allow the 
inference that there is probability 1 – alpha that the next threat level will have an SRI that is 
within the confidence interval. Therefore, assuming that alpha equals 0.05, the area under the 
standard normal curve equals (1 - alpha), or 95%; this value is therefore ± 1.96. Thus, the 
confidence interval can therefore be calculated as follows:  








 96.1             Equation  5.1 
Equation  5.1: Confidence Interval 
Using Equation  5.1, the confidence interval is 0.0291. Accordingly, the confidence interval then 
equals 1.431 ± 0.0291 or approximately [1.402, 1,460]. To test this hypothesis, SRIs of the 
fourth (1.641), fifth (1.437), sixth (1.301), and eighth (1.255) threat levels were chosen and their 
means (μ0) were computed and checked in order to determine whether they fell within the range 
of the confidence interval, the mean equals 1.410, which definitely falls within the range of the 
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confidence interval. Therefore, it can be said with 95% confidence that the mean of all SRIs of 
any number of threat levels within a  20% range of the original threat level and at a fixed 
budget (i.e., in this case, $40,000,000) ranges from approximately 1.402 to 1,460. Generally, 
these results show that the mean SRI for any number of threat levels μSRI, in this interval, the 
probability of obtaining a sample mean ( μSRI ) greater than 1.460 is only 5% likely to happen. 
Likewise, any mean threat level ( μSRI ) less than 1.402 is only 5% likely to happen. 
 
5.4 LYCAA Feedback 
Research meetings and interviews were held with security personnel at LYCAA headquarters 
and LYCAA’s international airport, a survey questionnaire was completed, and LYCAA official 
tested and reviewed the framework by entering their in-place and proposed upgrade screening 
measures. The following feedback was collected:  
1. The security metric was a valuable attribute of the framework that will facilitate security 
risk assessment at airports and will enable decision makers to evaluate and prioritize 
upgrade strategies more accurately. 
2. The optimization model adds advantageous features that will help security officials 
allocate their constrained resources more cost-effectively. 
3. The overall performance and simplicity of the framework as well as the multiple levels of 
SRI and security scores make it a practical and reliable user-friendly tool for any risk-
based plan for upgrading security infrastructure at airports. 
4. The flexibility of the framework enables security officials to consider the effects of 
changing one or more mitigation measures at the SCP, subsystem, and system levels as 
well as the resulting SRIs. 
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5. The optimization model makes it easy for decision makers to run “what if” scenarios, and 
to investigate the effects of imposing specific constraints or of forcing the framework to 
comply with specific security requirements or needs. 
6. The ability of the framework to produce detailed security scores, SRIs, and 
comprehensive descriptions and assessments at different levels is a significant feature 
that LYCAA officials appreciated and valued. 
7. The customization capabilities enhance practicality of the framework so that it can be 
used for optimizing multiple-year upgrade plans. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
A risk-based optimization framework has been successfully developed. The framework considers 
practical upgrade constraints and uses an optimization approach to help airport authorities make 
cost-effective decisions that will maximize the return on upgrade investments. The optimization 
framework was validated through expert opinions from GTAA personnel and a real-life case 
study at an LYCAA international airport. Feedback from both GTAA and LYCAA officials 
verified the usefulness and functionality of the developed framework and its prototype. 
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As pivotal links in the mass transportation infrastructure, airports have a substantial impact on 
regional and national economies. After the 9/11 tragedy, airport security has been of paramount 
importance in Canada and worldwide. To improve aviation security, governments and airport 
authorities have devoted significant resources to developing strategies and implementing more 
tightened security measures. Extensive programs have been initiated to help detect, deter, and 
mitigate security risks. At the research level, a number of studies have examined airport security 
by assessing prospective threat scenarios, deficiencies in the security systems that contribute to 
possible exploitation of the vulnerability of airports, and the potential forms of the consequences 
of breaches of security.   
 
To help airport authorities make cost-effective decisions with respect to airport security 
upgrades, this research has developed a practical risk-based optimization framework for 
upgrading PCBSS in airport terminals. The framework features an innovative security metric for 
quantifying the three main dimensions of security risk at airport terminals: threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences. It then uses the results to produce a security risk index (SRI). 
The security metric was built to assess the PCBSS at any international airport terminal. The risk 
dimension associated with threat is categorized as explosives, sharp blades, and biological attack. 
Under each category a number of threat types are identified: the explosive category includes 
weapons, bombs, and explosive liquids; sharp blades includes knives, swords, razors, and 
cutters; and biological attack can be associated with choking, nerve, blood, and blister. 
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Vulnerabilities are assessed based on how the countermeasure (in place and suggested) is 
effective in detecting the potential threats at the level of system (terminal), subsystems (departure 
and arrival), and subsystem components (security checkpoints). The consequences are addressed 
from four perspectives: casualties, downtime, public exposure, and the amount of loss expressed 
as a percentage of the total replacement cost of the whole or part of the terminal.  
 
The framework has an additional novel attribute: an optimization model that integrates the SRI, 
the upgrade options, and a genetic algorithm (GA) mechanism in order to produce cost-effective 
upgrade decisions. Since realistically, vulnerability is the only risk element that can be improved, 
a database was built that inventories the reliability (i.e., effectiveness) and cost data of state-of-
the-art mitigation measures (equipment, devices, and measures). The database is dynamically 
linked with the optimization model so that multiple “what-if” scenarios can be investigated 
whenever any mitigation measure is changed, thereby enabling the decision makers to observe 
the resulting overall SRI, the benefit that would be derived from the security upgrade, the total 
cost of the upgrade, and the benefit cost ratio for each scenario. 
 
Hypothetical data were used to test the functionality and performance of the framework, and 
three different approaches to decision making were examined: a manual decision approach based 
on simple ranking and risk priority index strategies, mathematical optimization, and an 
automated approach that uses an evolutionary algorithm. The performances of the three decision 
approaches were compared, and the results indicate that the GA-based decision strategy is more 
effective than the other two strategies. The GA-based strategy was therefore used to further 
validate the framework through a real-life case-study at an international airport. To ensure the 
optimality of the upgrading decisions, realistic constraints, including budget limits, minimum 
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and maximum upgrade limits, and specific levels of minimum upgrade types, were introduced 
into the optimization model.  
 
Two objective functions were experimented with: one for maximizing the benefit/cost ratio and 
one for minimizing the overall SRI. The goal was to ensure that the framework is capable of 
producing the most cost-effective upgrade strategy with respect to suggesting the best 
countermeasures, optimizing the upgrade budget, and satisfying the constraints. Although the 
objective functions were formulated to optimize upgrade plans for multiple years, to simplify the 
optimization process the framework was run so that it considered a one-year planning horizon. 
Security officials are nevertheless able to optimize multiple-year plans by feeding the 
optimization model with the optimization decisions for the first year as input (starting GA 
population) for the second year, and so on. 
 
A comparison of the results of the two objective functions reveals that the “minimizing SRI” 
decision strategy is the most promising approach. Consequently, based on the literature, on 
information obtained from several research interviews and meetings with security professionals 
at the GTAA, and on needs with respect to practicality and user friendliness, a risk-based 
optimization framework prototype was developed and modeled in an MS Excel spreadsheet 
environment in order to facilitate the framework validation. 
 
The framework was validated through a demonstration to a group of security officials at the 
GTAA in order to obtain the opinions of security experts and through practical implementation 
in a real-life case study at a LYCAA international airport. A variety of decision strategies were 
tested: LYCAA’s priority rank-based and priority index-based approaches, a GA-based 
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maximizing the B/C ratio, and a GA-based solution for minimizing SRI. The results were 
compared, and then presented to and validated by security officials at the LYCAA Headquarters 
and at the designated LYCAA international airport. The framework was found to be dynamic 
and flexible in its ability to compute and display simultaneous aggregated and overall SRIs, user-
friendly with respect to its interface, interactive in permitting users to introduce or eliminate 
constraints and to select specific measures, and capable of performing multiple “what-if” 
upgrade scenarios that can satisfy the various technical needs and requirements related to 
security at an airport terminal.  
 
6.2 Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be drawn:  
1. It is feasible to quantify airport security risks using the developed threat, vulnerability, 
and consequence security metrics.  
2. Security system upgrades at airports can be optimized using the preceding metrics and 
the developed optimization model based genetic algorithm.  
3. Optimizing upgrade decisions based on minimizing the overall security risk index is the 
best strategy for determining the most cost-effective upgrade decisions. 
4. The testing with the decision approaches, experiments, and sensitivity analysis presented 
proven the framework’s capability of innovatively producing upgrade results that involve 
minimal expenditure, the lowest risk, and a quantified return on investment. 
5. Based on the validation feedback, the framework’s flexibility, dynamic interactivity, and 
simplicity will make it a helpful decision support tool for security officials at airports. 
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6.  An additional advantage of the developed framework is its potential to be extended to 
include other security systems in airports in order to produce an overall security risk 
index at the airport level. 
 
6.3 Research Contribution 
Based on the literature survey in Chapter 2, the development of the security risk metric and 
optimization model, and the results and findings determined through research validation, this 
research has made the following contributions: 
1. A comprehensive automated risk-based framework has been developed for the 
assessment and upgrading of security systems at airport terminals. Focusing on the 
PCBSS, the framework incorporates an analytical model that assesses the threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences related to the PCBSS, and it incorporates a dynamic 
optimization model based on GAs mechanism that provides a near optimum upgrade 
plan.  
2.  The developed framework (security metrics and GA-based optimization model) is a 
potentially useful internal tool that allows aviation officials, airport authorities, and 
security personnel to assess the risk status of their security systems, and to determine the 
required cost-effective rectifying actions that will to maintain the security risk at a 
specified level of service. 
3.  An innovative security metric that quantifies PCBSS security risks in the form of SRIs 
has been produced. As a product of the developed security metric, the SRIs provide a 
quantitative means of determining the level of security risk at the levels of the subsystem 
components, the subsystem, and the system. Likewise, when the security metric is 
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expanded to include a network of airports, the metric has the potential of being beneficial 
at the national airport network level. 
4.  The framework is the first tool of its kind that quantitatively assesses the dimensions of 
risk at airport terminals and that fully incorporates the results of the assessment (SRIs) 
into an automated optimization model that was a GA-mechanism-based methodology to 
search for the solutions. 
5.  One of the main advantages of this research is that the aggregated and overall security 
indexes can be employed to facilitate different types of security infrastructure upgrades, 
decision-making analysis with respect to techniques, and strategies over different 
planning horizons, and with a variety of constraints and needs. 
6. The incorporation of the GA mechanism enables the framework to handle large-scale 
optimization cases that involve huge solution spaces, which is a typical problem in 
complex infrastructure management systems.  
7.  The flexible, interactive, and automatic features of the framework make it a unique 
decision support tool that offers airport security decision makers the opportunities to 
customize it and tweak its models in order to meet the specific upgrade constraints of 
their airport and to satisfy special security requirements and needs at specific levels. 
 
6.4 Future Research 
The following summary of recommendation is based on feedback from both GTAA and LYCAA 
security officials and on discussions about ways to enhance the security metrics and the 
optimization model and to improve the overall performance of the framework: 
1- Introduce priority weights at the security checkpoints (SCPs) and subsystem levels in the 
case of a single system and at the system level in the case of multiple systems. The 
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objective is to allocate upgrade funds to the most influential SCP at the subsystem level 
and to the most influential subsystem at the system level and so on. 
2- Expand the optimization model to include two-to three-year planning horizons or to use 
two-to three-year slices, and modify the associated constraints and needs accordingly. 
3- Continue developing the MS Excel spreadsheet prototype so that overall performance can 
be improved and the framework will be capable of producing customized detailed 
security reports. Decision makers will then be able to specify individual parameters 
immediately after the assessment is complete, to tweak or modify them during the 
subsequent steps in the optimization process.  
4- Develop the framework so that it can consider a multi-objective optimization function, 
and test the approach of incremental effectiveness (e.g., improvements in the SRI versus 
the B/C). 
5- Since the framework has been developed using a risk-based metric, and due to the 
significance of its security metrics and optimization model, GTAA and LYCAA officials 
recommended expanding the developed framework and customizing it so that it includes 
all other security systems at the airport level, with the goal of adoption by the entire 
airport authority. 
6- Continue the ongoing co-operation with GTAA and LYCAA security personnel in order 
to collect more practical data and integrate them into the framework. It is assumed that 
more collaboration and involvement of security experts will help with the reviewing, 
feedback, and authenticating of the design and with the integration and implementation of 
the developed risk-based framework. 
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APPENDIX A  
GENETIC ALGORITHMS 
A.1 Introduction 
Genetic Algorithms (GAs) were initiated as a result of a research done by John Holland in the 
60s at University of Michigan in the USA, which published later in 1975. GAs fit into stochastic 
search methods class”. Other stochastic search methods include “simulated annealing, threshold 
acceptance, and some forms of branch and bound”. In addition, contrary to other stochastic 
search methods “genetic algorithms operate on a population of solutions” (Matthew, 2008). 
GAs are adaptive heuristic search algorithm premised on nature evolvement principles that first 
laid down by Charles Darwin of survival of the fittest. The basic concept of GAs is designed to 
simulate evolution processes in natural system, as such, GAs represent an intelligent utilization 
of a random search within a defined search space called population. The Main advantages of 
GAs include derivatives are not required, can be parallelized simply, local minima can 
potentially be escaped (Moorkamp, 2005). Additionally, GAs have been widely studied, 
experimented and applied in many fields in engineering worlds, and have been shown to be a 
powerful adjustable search technique for finding optimal parameters in large and complex spaces 
(De Jong et al., 1993).  
 
A.2 Genetic Algorithms Principle 
Genetic algorithms as probabilistic search procedures designed to work on large spaces involving 
states that can be represented by strings of bits (1 and 0). These methods are inherently parallel, 
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using a distributed set of samples from the space (a population of strings) to generate a new set 
of samples. (Goldberg and Holland 1988). 
 
GAs are modeled slackly to actuate a population of individuals that undergo selection in the 
presence of variation-inducing operators such as mutation and recombination (crossover). A 
fitness function is used to evaluate individuals, and reproductive success varies with fitness. The 
summary of genetic algorithms process is illustrated Figure A1 (Goldberg and Holland 1988; 
Moorkamp, 2005). 
 
Figure A1: Genetic Algorithms process (Goldberg and Holland 1988; Moorkamp 2005) 
 
 
A.3 Applying Genetic Algorithms 
Modeling of problem internal search space representation is the cornerstone in finding the most 
optimum solution. Conventionally, GAs used to represent points in the search space by fixed-
length strings. Therefore, the first step would be encoding solutions of the problem (optimization 
parameters), which also known as a genome (chromosome or DNA). Second, defined genomes 
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population is created by GAs.  The algorithm randomly generates a number of DNA strings of 
the required length of population size N (Moorkamp, 2005). Third, crossover and mutation is 
applied in between population’s chromosomes (parents) to generate new chromosomes (child – 
offspring) according to a variety of selection criteria. Whereas, these criteria ensure choosing the 
best genomes to match succeeding crossover, the fitness/ or objective function will determine the 
robustness of each chromosome.  
 
A.3.1 Iteration 
Generating a new population using the successful chromosome is called iteration. For next 
iteration, only chromosomes that achieved the desired objective function values receive high 
calculated probabilities, and will be selected to generate new population of a sample size N 
(Matthew, 2008). 
 
A.3.2 Crossover and Mutation 
If there was no innovation, crossover and mutation are the two steps to be used to generate new 
population space member. Crossover is defined as logically organized change of information.  In 
case of GAs, beyond a preferred point and based on a selected probability two strings exchange 
their DNA.  The exchange output will be new chromosomes (children) that will merge good 
attribute and similarities with old the strings (parents). Alternatively, mutation is unsystematic in 
nature in introducing a new string in the population. The idea is to change the value of one of bits 
in the parameter representation based on a defined probability. Mutation probability is always 
chosen low to ensure that only about 10% of the population experience mutation (Matthew, 
2008).  
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A.4 Genetic Algorithms Representation 
Originally Holland represented chromosomes of genetic algorithms in strings of bits. Other 
forms of representations are valid too, like “arrays, trees, lists, or any other object Figure A2. But 
you must define genetic operators (initialization, mutation, crossover, comparison) for any 
representation”. Moreover, it is important that each string “must represent a complete solution to 
the problem you are trying to optimize” (Matthew, 2008).  
 
Figure A2: Some examples of GAs representations (Matthew, 2008)
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APPENDIX B  
MITIGATION MEASURES RELIABILITY AND COST DATABASE 





B.2 Security Background Mitigation Measures 
 
 
B.3 X-Ray and Explosives Detection System Measures  






















Sensitivity Analysis Experimental Threat levels  
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Threat levels in Experiment 4 
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Threat levels in Experiment 5 
 
 
Threat levels in Experiment 7 
 
Threat levels in Experiment 6 
 
 



















Threat levels in Experiment 10 
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